READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
Gradually, the concept of the CoG has
been adopted by various armed forces
and NATO as one of the most crucial
planning concepts linked to operational
art. Furthermore, the term ‘CoG’ has
evolved in response to a demand for
better understanding and, consequently,
effective use. This is evidenced by the
definitions found in two different versions
of AAP-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions, of 2014 and 2017 (extant
definition in NATO). In the former, the
CoG is defined as “Characteristics,
capabilities or localities from which a
nation, an alliance, a military force or
other grouping derives its freedom of
action, physical strength or will to fight.” 3
In the latter, the CoG is “The primary
source of power that provides an actor
its strength, freedom of action and/or will
to fight.” 4 A possible explanation of the
amendments follows:
• The primary source of power has
replaced characteristics, capabilities
or localities. It could be said that this
change simplified and broadened
the term, enabling its use at the
political-strategic level. For example,
characteristics,
capabilities
and
localities primarily imply relevance
to military forces or power. In this
case, what about the economy, as an
instrument of national power, which
can be used as leverage against an
adversary (political-strategic domain)?
• The use of actor instead of nation,
alliance, military force or other
grouping. It could be said that the word
‘actor’ has broad meaning, including
all the players, who are involved in a
crisis (Non-Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations, NA5CRO) or war (Article
5 Operations), at all levels (tactical,
operational-joint, strategic) in the
context of the comprehensive approach
of the operations.
of action’, because without ‘strength’
and ‘will to fight’ there is no freedom of
action.
The CoG is always an entity and exists
at all levels of war: Political/strategic,
operational and tactical. 5 Different level,
different CoG. Thus the level should
precede any discussion about CoG.
• Political-Strategic CoG: This could
be a moral and physical/strength CoG,
such as one or a set of leaders (political-
military), an alliance, a military force,
a set of critical functions or national
will. 6 However, these CoGs could be
challenged in the next section.
• Operational CoG: Usually, it is the
military capabilities/elements of armed
forces or capabilities (characteristic) of
the operational environment. 7
• Tactical CoG: It is often a force
element/critical capability (e.g. tactical
reserve or bridging assets). 8 We could
add that at the tactical level the CoG can
also be a key terrain (e.g. a bridge over
the river linking a bridgehead to the far
side with the near side; without a bridge
for the crossing of reinforcements and
supplies the bridgehead is doomed).
Moreover, for Clausewitz the purpose
of war is the attainment of political
objectives. In this sense the CoG at
the political level provides freedom
of action, which in turn leads to the
achievement of the political objectives.
Therefore, it could be said that the
strategic CoG is linked with the strategic
objectives by undermining, neutralising
or destroying an adversary’s strategic
CoG, which allows one to achieve his
strategic objectives in an easier way.
Consequently, planners should always
bear in mind that CoG are linked to
objectives at every level. Having defined
the concept of CoG, the next step is
the search for a process that provides
better understanding of it and enables its
identification.
Analysing and Identifying the
CoG
According to Clausewitz, the CoG can
be found in the location “where the
mass is concentrated most densely.” 9
He continues identifying the CoG under
different circumstances: In civil war –
‘domestic strife’ – it is the capital of the
country; in small countries, dependent
on the power of large ones, it is the
army of the protector; in an alliance the
CoG lies in the community of interest;
and in the case of popular uprisings, it
is the personality of the leaders and
public opinion. 10 Nevertheless, there is
not a description about the conceptual
background and method that Clausewitz
used in determining the above CoGs
(possibly because he died before he has
finished his work). This ambiguity due to
lack of a specific process in identifying
the CoG has been, and sometimes still
is, one of the most challenging problems
facing planners.
One solution to the problem was
proposed in 1996 by Dr. Joe Strange,
a professor at the US Marine Corps
War College. Through his analytical
framework he introduced the concept
of Critical Factors – namely comprised
of Critical Capabilities (CC) and Critical
Requirements (CR) – linked with the
CoG and its Critical Vulnerabilities
(CV). 11 In a few words here is his way of
thinking: By exploiting CVs, a force can
deny or degrade CRs essential for CCs.
Degrading or denying CCs leads to denial
or degradation of the CoG. Dr. Strange’s
CG-CC-CR-CV process is summarised
in the table below (Figure 1): 12
• Last, but not least, in the final part of
the definition, the ‘freedom of action,
physical strength or will to fight’ that
was replaced by its strength, freedom
of action and/or will to fight. Actually, it is
a minor change – the physical strength
has become strength in general. This
adjustment could be imposed in an
attempt to simplify and expand the term,
enabling incorporation of moral strength
in the definition. Yet this phrase could
be replaced by the simpler ‘freedom
3 AAP-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, NATO, NSO, 2014.
4 AAP-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, NATO, NSO, 2017.
5 AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, (A) V1, Draft Edition (SD 3), 12
Aug 2017, p. 3-5. As for the definition of CoG, the new AJP-5 is in line with the above most
updated version of AAP-06. .
6 Joint Publication (JP 5-0), Joint Planning, US Joint Staff, 16 June 2017, p. IV-23.
7 JP 5-0, Ibid.
8 APP-28, Tactical Planning for Land Forces, Edition A, Version (Draft) 1, January 2018,
NATO, NCO, p.2-22.
Figure 1 – The CG-
CC-CR-CV process
9 Rueschhoff, Jan L. & Dunne, Jonathan, Ibid, p.485.
10 Rueschhoff, Jan L. & Dunne, Jonathan, Ibid, p. 596.
11 Dr. Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian
Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language, Respectives on Warfighting,
Number 4, Marine Corps University, 1996, online at https://archive.org/stream/
centersofgravity00stra#page/146/search/141 (accessed 3 Sep 2018).
12 Dr Strange uses for the Centre of Gravity the abbreviation of CG instead of CoG. Joe
Strange, Ibid, p.146.
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