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Even in this case, following Dr. Strange’s
model in identifying and analysing the
CoG, the problem still exists. Strict
application of the CG-CC-CR-CV
method meant that, if starting with the
identification of the CoG, it could shift
the process to a long term wrangle over
what is and is not the COG. Normally,
this argument comes to an end when a
decision is made by the officer with the
strongest personality or highest rank, if
not the commander. It could be said that
ignoring the first key consideration of the
aforementioned method, namely steps
1-4 do not have to be conducted in a
rigid sequence, many planners could fall
into the trap of the past: Misconception,
wasted energy and time due to absence
of a clear process of identifying the CoG.
This would prove to be the key to solving
the problem.
Figure 2 – Col. Eikmeier’s CoG Analysis
In 2004, Colonel Dale Eikmeier (US Army,
Retired) highlighted the importance of
first identifying the objectives of actors
and then Critical Factors (CG-CC-
CR-CV). In essence, he improved Dr.
Strange’s model, changing the sequence
of the steps, starting the process at the
designated (or estimated for adversaries)
goal and introducing a validity test, as
depicted below (Figures 2 and 3): 13
In fact, Dr. Strange and Col. Eikmeier
set the foundations for the CoG analysis
method that is used today not only by
NATO, but also by the armed forces of
many countries.
Figure 3 – Col. Eikmeier’s Validity Test Example
NATO’s Model: Due to the complexity
of the operational environment and the
presence of multiple actors and agencies,
NATO seeks to achieve its objectives
through a comprehensive approach. 14
In this context of the comprehensive
approach to operations, the CoG
analysis model analyses an actor as a
system in order to identify strengths and
vulnerabilities or even better conditions
and effects that need to be established
in achieving the objectives. Operational
CoGs are normally a dominant capability,
which allows the actor to achieve
operational objectives. The NATO
CoG Analysis Matrix (Figure 4) allows
analysts to choose the starting point (first
identification of the CoG and then CC or
the opposite): 15
Figure 4 – NATO CoG Analysis Matrix
13 Col. Dale C. Eikmeier, US Army, Center of Gravity Analysis, Military Review, July-August 2004, p.3-4, at http://www. au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/eikmeier.pdf (accessed 4 Sep 2018).
14 NATO’s experiences in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere have shown the complexity of the crises today. Military means are insufficient to deal with such crises alone. These challenges
demand a holistic-comprehensive approach, a coordinated action of military and non-military actors. This actually is the meaning of the comprehensive approach. Effective comprehensive
approach requires all actors to contribute to solving crises-conflicts. From military perspective, a comprehensive approach is based on a common situational understanding and recognition
that non-military actions may support military and vice-versa. AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition E, Version 1, February 2017, p.2-4,6
15 AJP-5, Ibid, Annex B, p.5-8 and Allied Command Operations, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), V2.0, 4 October 2013, p.4-46. The model is described as Joint Model
in the US Air Force Doctrine, Center of Gravity Analysis Methods, Operations and Planning, Annex 3-0, Curtis E. Lemay Center, Last Updated: 04 November 2016, at https://www.doctrine.
af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Annex_3-0/3-0-Annex-OPERATIONS-PLANNING.pdf (accessed 4/9/2018).
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