ARRC JOURNAL
CENTRE OF GRAVITY:
HOW AN OLD CONCEPT IS
IMPLEMENTED TODAY
Colonel Alexandris Konstantinos, Hellenic Army
“So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong, and strike at what is weak…
First attack the enemy’s strategy, then his alliance, next his army and last his cities”
Sun Tzu
When the Prussian officer Carl von
Clausewitz decided to write his thoughts
about war, nobody could imagine the
impact that his unfinished work, the
memorable On War, would have on
future generations of strategists and on
the way wars, campaigns and battles
are conducted. One of his enduring
contributions to contemporary warfare is
the idea of ‘Centre of Gravity’ (CoG): The
focal point of power against which all the
efforts should be directed and on which
the predominance-victory rests.
Moreover, no one in 19th century –
Clausewitz’s era – could predict the
debates that his CoG proposal would
provoke in the future. The concept
of CoG re-emerged onto the military
scene as theory/doctrine in the 1980s.
Soon after, it became a controversial
issue because of its vague definition,
challenging process of identification and
operational utility. Since then the concept
of CoG has evolved and transformed –
despite receiving criticism concerning
its relevance in the context of the
modern operational environment – into a
fundamental planning tool for campaigns
and major operations.
Identifying and analysing friendly and
adversary sources of power/strength
is one of the most important tasks that
confront planners. Faulty analysis can
have a negative impact on a campaign:
Wasted effort, unacceptable cost in terms
of lives, equipment and time, and an
inability to accomplish military objectives
that potentially leads to mission failure.
However, even today – despite the long-
term presence of the CoG in military
life as a commonly accepted doctrinal
concept, as well as an integral part of
planning – planners find themselves
engaged in lengthy discussions about
the determination of the belligerents’
CoG. The difficulties lie in the conceptual
understanding of the CoG and the
application of a practical framework for
its utility – the method of analysis and
use of its outputs.
The purpose of this essay is to provide
a more comprehensive understanding
of the concept of CoG as well as its
implementation. Its focus will be at the
joint/operational level of war and how
it contributes to the coherence and
effectiveness of the planning process.
The content of this essay is not meant
to challenge existing NATO doctrine,
but it will highlight the significance of
this essential, yet controversial and oft
criticised, planning tool.
Defining the CoG
Clausewitzian strategic thinking was
introduced to the American doctrinal
world in the 1980s in an attempt to
counter overwhelming Soviet military
power in a potential war in Europe.
Successfully confronting the mighty Red
Army could be achievable through a
revision of the military theory that would
focus on the effective employment of
available resources. Theorists found a
possible solution in Clausewitz’s original
concept of CoG. Concentrating efforts
and power on the adversary’s CoG
could bring victory. Since the concept’s
introduction to the US military in the
1980s, it has become an essential part
of operational art, which has provoked
perpetual discussions. 1
Clausewitz states that “out of these
characteristics a certain centre of
gravity develops, the hub of all power
and movement, on which everything
depends. That is the point against which
all our energies should be directed.” 2 This
definition of CoG could be considered
generic and vague. The Prussian
strategist gave a generic definition of
the CoG without any further description
and explanations about what he actually
meant, probably because he died before
the completion of his work.
1 For more information about its evolution and discussions, see Rueschhoff, Jan L. & Dunne, Jonathan. Centers of Gravity from the ‘Inside out’, JFQ, 60, 1st Quarter 2011, p.120, at http://www.
au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/rueschhoff _dunne_cog_inside_out.pdf (accessed 31 Aug 2018).
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, p. 595-596.
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