argument is that you cannot imagine a being with the same capabilities as this zombie that is not conscious . Suppose that we were to analyse the zombie brain next to a human one . We would not be able to tell the difference as they both appear to be human . Dennet uses the term heterophenomenology to describe a third-party way of analysing consciousness , usually through describing behaviour ( Zahavi , 2007 , p . 22 ). He argues that because a zombie is behaviourally identical to human beings , there is no way to distinguish between the two through third person analysis . However , it can be argued that this leaves out whether there is something different between conscious thinkers and their zombie counterparts . Dennet counters this by refuting the notion that consciousness is anything above the thinking that a particular emotion is there and feels real . For example , there is nothing more to the feeling of pain ; pain is just the feeling that something is painful ( Zahavi , 2007 , p . 24 ). If a zombie believes that something is painful , then the zombie is having a conscious experience of pain . If a zombie is having a conscious experience of pain , just as a human would , then there is no distinction between humans and zombies . Therefore Chalmers philosophical zombies are not possible . This attack on Chalmers argument is particularly convincing because it criticises our understanding of consciousness . It suggests that when we put a strict definition of consciousness into Chalmers argument , we cannot conceive of a ‘ zombie ’ that has all the capacities described as not being conscious .
The next criticism of Chalmers conceivability argument that I will discuss is functionalism . Functionalism is arguably a more coercive understanding of the relationship between consciousness and mind than the presupposed identity between mind and brain that Chalmers was trying to refute . It is the view that consciousness arises from the functional roles of a system . A philosophical zombie holds all the functional qualities for consciousness to arise , as it has the same functional structure as a human brain . It would then follow that it would not be a zombie at all as it would have the conscious capability of a human itself , if adopting the functional theory of consciousness . This , however , is not a compelling criticism of the conceivability argument , as it counters an argument for Dualism with another theory of mind that itself is still contested ( Kirk , 2021 ). In order for a criticism against Chalmers conceivability argument to be successful , it needs to attack the premises of the argument itself , rather than proposing a new theory of mind as a solution .
This leads on to the final criticism of Chalmers conceivability argument that I will discuss . It is arguably one of the best ways to criticise Chalmers attack on physicalism , as it denies that whatever is conceivable is in fact a possibility . This argument would show that Chalmers claim is wrong without having to appeal to another view on the mind-body problem as a solution . Chalmers recognises a distinction between primary conceivability and secondary conceivability . Primary conceivability states that if something we want to conceive ( zombie ) is ‘ actually the case ’ then , if we can conceive of another world , and that said world is the actual world , this zombie exists in this world ( Mizrahi and Morrow , 2014 , p . 2 ). If something is secondarily conceivable , then you can imagine something existing given the way things are now in this world ( Mizrahi and Morrow , 2014 , p . 2 ). Whilst some things can have primary conceivability , they do not have to have secondary conceivability “ because of a posteriori necessities ” ( Mizrahi and Morrow , 2014 , p . 2 ). A posteriori necessities are truths that were
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