Describe a Conceivability Argument for Dualism . How can the Physicalist Respond ? Is that Response Successful ? HEATHER GOODSON
In this essay I will first discuss the conceivability argument for Dualism put forward in Chalmers ‘ Philosophical Zombies ’ account . I will then analyse some physicalist responses , arguing that some manage to overcome the problems put forward by Chalmers argument . This essay is not a conclusive argument for or against Dualism , rather an account of whether a particular conceivability argument for Dualism is successful .
Chalmers Zombie Argument starts by suggesting that a world of ‘ Philosophical Zombies ’ is conceivably possible . He chooses to focus on describing his zombie twin , who he describes as functionally identical to him in every physical sense and also every functional sense psychologically . He describes himself eating a bar of chocolate , with a small pain in his shoulder , all whilst enjoying a nice view out of a window . He describes his zombie twin also completing the same actions , by eating the chocolate and looking out of the window , however the experience of those actions is not the same . He claims that whilst his zombie is observing the tree , he is not experiencing anything behind processing the information . When the zombie is tasting the chocolate , Chalmers claims that the same psychological state is occurring in the brain that would occur if he is eating the chocolate himself , however there will not be any feeling attached to the experience . Chalmers is claiming that the zombie has no qualia attached to experience ; “ there is nothing it is like to be a zombie ” ( Chalmers , 1996 , p . 95 ).
The Conceivability Argument for Dualism that
Chalmers puts forward is that these philosophical zombies are conceivably possible . This is not to say that they would ever exist in our current world , just that we can understand the concept of a zombie without the feel of experience , just like we can imagine something simple that does exist , like a paperclip . Conceivability arguments state that whatever is conceivable could be a possibility . It then follows that because zombies are conceivable , philosophical zombies are a possibility ( Kirk , 2021 ).
This conceivability argument puts forward an argument against physicalism . Some forms of physicalism suggest that feelings , for example sadness , is type identical to a neuron in your brain firing . However , if we can conceive a philosophical zombie that has the same neurons firing that Chalmers would have if he was sad , yet experiences no sadness , then it follows that sadness is not type identical with that specific neuron firing off ; the mind is not identical to the brain . This then leaves that Dualism is a possibility as physicalism cannot be true .
The first physicalist response to Chalmers conceivability argument that I will discuss is put forward by Dennet . Dennet argues against the idea that we can fully conceive of a philosophical zombie ( Kirk , 2021 ). He claims that if you try to imagine a zombie that is capable of having ‘ informational sensitivity ’ like humans , and still believe that this highly functional zombie is still not conscious , then you have not imagined that zombie correctly ( Dennet , 1995 , p . 325 ). His
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