discovered empirically but could never be false metaphysically ( LaPorte , 2018 ).
The particular argument against conceivability entailing possibility that I will discuss is put forward byMizrahi and Morrow . They start by appealing to logic , claiming that if something is true , then it must be necessarily possible that it is true ( Mizrahi and Morrow , 2014 , p . 4 ). Through appealing to the use of logic , they form an argument against primary conceivability entailing possibility . They start by describing a perfect ‘ deity ’ that is omnipotent and omnipresent , actively engaging in every action in the world in which it exists . They also state that because this deity is perfect it entails that this deity must exist , because a widely accepted attribute of perfection is that existence is essential . All attributes of this deities perfect character must be necessary , for if it is to be perfect it must be necessary that they are omnipotent , omnipresent and existent ( Mizrahi and Morrows , 2014 , p . 6 ). It is argued that we can conceive of this perfect deity , just as some people throughout history have believed in an omnipotent being . Mizrahi and Morrow argue that because this being is present in every action in the world which it exists , and because it has all its characteristic attributes necessarily , it would then follow that every action in this world happens necessarily . They then claim that if this deity does exist , then there must be a “ brute metaphysical law ” that states only this necessary world with a necessary perfect being could ever exist ( Mizrahi and Morrow , 2014 , p . 7 ).
Mizrahi and Morrow then use this brute metaphysical law that exists in this world to show that primary conceivability does not entail possibility . They claim that because this world where all actions are necessary and conducted by a necessary being is conceivable , and in this possible world you can access no other possible worlds because of the nature of this necessary being , this refutes conceivability entailing possibility . They state that we can imagine other possible world that exist besides this necessary world , but if this world did exist , then these other worlds that we can imagine would not be possible . This demonstrates a situation where conceivability does not entail possibility , as it contradicts the fact that we can still conceive of other possible worlds . Mizrahi and Morrow then argue through logic that , if it is conceivable that this world is “ necessarily false ”, then this world just is necessarily false ( Mizrahi and Morrow , 2014 , p . 7 ). This then undermines the widely accepted view that conceivability entails possibility .
Whilst the argument is admittedly strange , it appeals to a logical thought experiment to disprove that conceivability entails possibility . If this argument is sufficient , then this would have implications for all conceivability arguments put forward in philosophy , not just Chalmers . However , this particular argument holds many criticisms . It claims that a perfect being is in fact conceivable , when this has been contested many times in philosophy of religion . Characteristics of a perfect being appear contradictory and incompatible with each other . It can also be contested that a perfect being has to necessarily exist . If you choose to believe that this deity is not conceivable , just like Dennet believes Chalmers zombies are not conceivable , then the argument collapses on itself . Whilst I would claim this particular argument does not provide conclusive evidence that conceivability does not entail possibility , the process of trying to deny this given fact is reasonable . I would argue that if an acceptable argument against conceivability leading to possibility is put forward , then this would be the best way to attack Chalmers argument , as it would refute the given fact that Chalmers argument relies on .
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