considers the later Wittgenstein to be a transcendental idealist and the Tractarian Wittgenstein not to be ( 2003 , 2011 , 2013 ). This has led to an interesting accusation made by Sullivan towards Moore , of reading the Tractatus under the influence of the later Wittgenstein . We should acknowledge an echo of intention between this discussion and the debate between new and traditional readings of the Tractatus : each side of the debate believes they understand Wittgenstein , whilst claiming the other side has misinterpreted him . First though , it is pertinent that we explore what is meant by transcendental idealism in the Tractatus .
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE TRACTATUS Idealism is defined by Moore as “ the view that some aspect of the form of that to which our representations answer depends on some aspect of the representations ” ( 2006 , p . 116 ). What Moore means with this phrasing is not just how the form of something is , but however it is — including its essential constituents , realistic qualifiers , and existential qualifiers — our representations ( what we think and imagine ) must answer to , for our representations to be representations at all : the form necessitates the representation . Moore identifies two further distinct idealisms : empirical idealism is immanent ; whilst transcendental idealism is transcendent . Transcendent idealism can offer a contingent base to the necessity between representation and form , by letting us say that “ the form of reality is determined at the transcendental level by the form of thought ” ( p . 118 ). At this level , representations effect physical reality through a dependence that is transcendent of physical reality . The physical universe answers to our representations , and it follows from this dependence that “ we cannot produce a representation to the effect that the physical universe depends on the existence of our representations without saying something false .
That the physical universe depends on the existence of our representations is a transcendent truth but an immanent falsehood ,” ( p . 118 ) the truth of transcendental idealism , therefore , remains unable to be represented or expressed , for any linguistic representation is immanent . An advantage here is that transcendental idealism , when considering an unrestricted use of the quantifier ‘ everything ’ contains everything immanent , and yet be transcendent . Moore admits that there are some rather decisive incoherencies to transcendental idealism : our production of the very representations it says we cannot produce when we state the view ; its internal contradiction whereby its own existence would negate its transcendent quality ; incoherence concerning what precisely is transcendent — but an evaluation of transcendental idealism is beyond the purpose of this essay . The point I simply wish to make is that transcendental idealism holds that there is a limit to thought and representation which exists immanently , whilst what is transcended beyond these limits cannot be expressed or represented .
Moore ( 2013 ) considers there to be two connections between the Tractatus and transcendental idealism . The first way is a rather direct attempt to say what grounds the essence of reality . This is Wittgenstein ’ s attempt to draw the limits of language from the inside , which will express limits of thought ( Sullivan , 2011 ). What is beyond this limit is unthinkable and unsayable , for the notion of a limit in the Tractatus is equivalent to the very nature of what is being limited . Sullivan construes the notion of a limit as a “ boundary that separates what has a certain nature and what does not ” ( 2011 , p . 172 ). When we attempt to articulate what it is for a proposition to represent the things they are ; we cannot escape repeating the proposition ( Moore , 2013 ). We fail to say anything concerning our knowledge of what the objects we are discussing
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