Was the Author of the Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus a Transcendental Idealist ?
LUKE FOO GUEST
Much of the exegetical discussion about Wittgenstein ’ s Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus ( shortened to Tractatus throughout the rest of this essay and abbreviated to TLP when citing the text ), as Peter Sullivan points out , has occurred across a split between the appropriateness of the traditional reading and the new reading ( 2003 ). Both Moore ( 2003 ) and Sullivan ( 2003 ) agree that the differences between the two readings are minimal , with Sullivan calling the discussion as “ no more than misunderstandings ” ( p . 197 ). Moore is somewhat more forgiving of the two rivalling interpretations : the new reading of the Tractatus may consider nothing ineffable , Wittgenstein elaborately produces nonsense that appears to have sense , confronting the reader with a tempting illusion that tests the appearance of sense so that the illusion disappears to reveal that nothing is being conveyed ; whilst the traditional reading holds that the Tractatus is trying to convey something ineffable about language and its limits that can only be displayed through its purposeful nonsense propositions ( Moore , 2003 ). It may seem that “ in overlooking the possibility that things other than truths are non-trivially ineffable , we are bound to see the two readings are irreconcilably different about whether Wittgenstein believes there is anything ( any truth ) that is ineffable ,” however , Moore encourages us to acknowledge that what is being proposed by both readings is to register a state of “ understanding Wittgenstein ” ( 2003 , pp . 180- 181 ). We can construe the ‘ something ’ ineffable that the traditional reading considers being conveyed is an understanding of Wittgenstein ; and the new reading ’ s claim that ‘ nothing ’ is ineffable we can construe the range of ‘ nothings ’
as restricted to that which conveys an understanding of Wittgenstein ( Moore , 2003 ). Whilst the treatment here of the two major approaches to the reading of the Tractatus is brief and certainly does not do justice to the full breadth of discussion and intention that interpreters from either side advocate , the discussion highlights something rather important : the amount of weight TLP 6.54 has had on much of the exegetical discussion surrounding the Tractatus and how much effort has gone into understanding Wittgenstein .
The focus of this essay shall be a conversation occurring between Moore and Sullivan about the Tractatus that is rather more restrained about understanding Wittgenstein than the debate outlined above . It is the title of this essay , which is shared with Moore ’ s 2013 paper . One may wonder “ why use the term ‘ author ’ rather than the name , Wittgenstein ?” There is general agreement concerning a split between the earlier and later works of Wittgenstein . Moore ( 2012 ) considers there to be a continuity between the two periods that share the same conception of philosophy , though where the early Wittgenstein is offering an account of philosophy , the later Wittgenstein is practising what he considered to be good philosophy . Stating the question this way limits our scope to the early Wittgenstein , and specifically the Wittgenstein that is concerned with the Tractatus . The difference may seem trivial to the concerns of the current essay , but where Moore ( 2003 , 2011 , 2012 , 2013 ) considers the author of the Tractatus to be a transcendental idealist and the later Wittgenstein to not be , Sullivan
SCHOOL OF THE ARTS 2021 / 2022
138