are , instead articulating their arrangement and relations .
The second way that the Tractatus connects to transcendental idealism is a less direct but far more significant concern for the book : “ Our understanding of why the attempt to express our inexpressible knowledge of objects is itself inexpressible ” ( Moore , 2013 , p . 245 ). We find ourselves in a similar predicament as when we attempt to articulate our knowledge of objects . We can only state how objects are , not what they are and Moore highlights TLP 1.1 to reinforce this . When we try to express what our understanding of thinking is , we are likely to resort to some form of transcendental idealism , that presents signs that have been adapted to a particular situation as though they had never been adapted ( Moore , 2003 ). Our fundamental error is not heeding to the warning Wittgenstein grants us at TLP 5.61 , that we are not able to go beyond the limits of the world , construed as the totality of facts , thought , and language , and see what is and is not there and view the limits , because what is beyond those limits cannot be said , or thought . This warning of Wittgenstein ’ s is to not treat limits as limitations . Though of course , when Wittgenstein states that “ the world is the totality of facts , not of things ” ( TLP 1.1 ), he fails to take his own advice , but more importantly is excluding certain possibilities . TLP 1.1 excludes possibilities which are judged beyond thought , perhaps embracing a version of transcendental idealism .
It would seem in the Tractatus there is nothing beyond the limit of logic , language , and thought , only nonsense - which we can understand to mean a ‘ sheer lack of sense ’. We become frustrated when we come up against these limits and we attempt to overcome them in a rather transcendental way : we employ concepts which are immanent that have been adapted to limitations as though they had not been adapted to limitations at all ( Sullivan , 2003 ). The two ways that Moore ( 2013 ) identifies transcendental idealism in the Tractatus appeals to the rougher sketch Sullivan ( 2003 ) provides us . Each is an example of an attempt to articulate what a concept is , but we remain limited , either by an inability to say something unsayable , or because a proposition is unable to display its form ( TLP 2.173 and 4.01 ). There is therefore a temptation to see the natural limits of language as a limitation that can be overcome , this is the illusion of sense that nonsense is able take on , an illusion we are privy to indulge in .
To summarise , the Tractatus considers the limit of language and thought to be an aspect of their essential nature , and when we confront this limit - such as when we try to state what an object is - we attempt to transcend it and produce signs as though there never was a limit at all , succumbing to the transcendental allure of illusionary nonsense ( Moore , 2003 ). Neither Moore nor Sullivan deny the presence of transcendental idealism , instead , their friendly conflict concerns the purpose transcendental idealism serves in the Tractatus . Answering this should also address our primary question . Now that we are familiar the relationship between transcendental idealism and Wittgenstein ’ s Tractatus , the focus shall now be what purpose does it serve , and whether this reflects Wittgenstein ’ s own personal appreciation .
WHAT IS TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM DOING IN THE TRACTATUS ? One possible role of transcendental idealism may be its rather simple utility . If we return to the original exegetical debate that introduced the essay , we can see that the nonsense that the Tractatus claims to contain , is able to be rather illuminating no matter what side you are on . Following this lead , Moore ( 2013 ) proposes that Wittgenstein acknowledges a certain purpose in transcendental idealism , that comes from
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