FALL 2013
DOMESTIC
Eroding at the Center
Understanding the present and future of political partisanship in
the United States Congress
O
ver the past several decades,
partisanship has grown in the
federal government and political
discourse has devolved to the point where
brinksmanship and crisis seem to be the
only way to get Democrats and Republicans to legislate. This partisan fighting
in Washington crescendoed this past October with the government shutdown and
debt ceiling crisis. To understand political
gridlock and take steps towards its mitigation, it is important to understand how
partisanship manifests itself differently
in the two chambers of Congress. In the
House, strong partisan allegiances seem
likely to persist, while in the Senate, there
is a greater possibility for compromise.
There is a large body of research detailing political polarization in the House
of Representatives. Gerrymandering is
often lamented as the source of political
impasse, but research shows redistricting
is not the primary cause of America’s
increased gridlock. Political scientists
Nolan McCarthy, Keith T. Poole, and
Howard Rosenthal argue there is little
evidence of a link between gerrymandering and polarization, but concede that
redistricting has increased the number of
Republican seats. More recent studies
instead suggest that polarization is a reflection of the American political disposition at large. In February 2013, Howard
Rosenthal teamed with Adam Bonica to
evaluate the polarizing effects of campaign contributions and how donors’
ideological beliefs affect representatives’
voting behavior. Their study, which examines thirty years of contribution data,
by KEVIN SCHOELZEL ‘14
indicates that in the short-term, it is unlikely the House will grow less partisan.
In the Senate, however, there may be
hope for cooperation. Structurally, the
Senate has advantages over the House
when it comes to fostering cross-aisle
Unless the American
voting public drastically
changes its preferences
for congressional
candidates, the same
brinksmanship behaviors
will be rewarded with
reelection.
agreements. First, members of the Senate
are insulated from fluctuations in public
opinion by longer terms. Additionally, in
most states, senators tailor their positions
to more diverse constituents than the parochial interests of smaller congressional
districts. As a result, the Senate is more
likely to exhibit bipartisanship. Among
senators, incentives for bipartisan cooperation are stronger for representatives
of states that did not vote for the presidential candidate of their party in the
last election. There are currently nineteen of these “purple” Senators. Politically, these senators must tread the line
between their principles, constituents,
and parties; thus, they are under more
pressure to broker deals, furthering bipartisan efforts. For example, during the
October 2013 debt crisis, Susan Collins,
Maine’s Republican senator, played a
critical role in negotiations. On October
11th, she put forth a compromise bill
with wide bipartisan support. Though
this bill did not reach the President, it encouraged dialogue between parti ??????)??????????????????????????????)??????????????????????????=?????????)M?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????)????????????????????????Q?????????)??????U?????M??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????9?????????)????????????????????????????????%?????!???????????????????????)????????????????????????????????U????????????????????????????????)??????????????????????
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