FEATURE
terrible, preventable decisions. These decisions, however, were part of a more
fundamental and disturbing handling of
Libya: a year and a half earlier, the Obama
administration launched 110 cruise missiles into a country where huge factions of
Islamist militants were well-positioned to
take control. How can this be considered
a legitimate foreign policy? What chain of
scenario-building justified such a scheme?
It is all too apparent from the operation that the Obama administration simply
did not scenario-build in Libya. Instead,
it slapped the hopeful name “Odyssey
Dawn” on an operation in a hopeful ‘movement,’ the “Arab Spring,” and then shot
off its rockets in an attempt to hit Gaddafi
and – in the resulting shockwave – propel
some humanitarian democrat into control.
Afterwards, when Obama declared to
the United Nations that Americans “stood
with” the “peaceful” Libyans in casting
off the tyrant Gaddafi, to which Libyans
was he referring? The gun-toting barbarians flogging Gaddafi’s pulped body in
the streets? This image clearly portended
the security situation unfolding in Libya
after the “revolution.” Indeed, according
to a recent analysis by Daniel Wagner
and Giorgio Cafiero of RealClearPolitics, “it would be an understatement to
say that the National Transition Council (NTC) has failed to govern Libya effectively since the fall of Gaddafi. The
majority of territory outside Tripoli has
fallen under the control of armed militias that have refused to disarm.” These
conditions were very apparent at the
time – yet Obama, like Carter before him,
took no meaningful preventative action.
Although Carter and Obama share
similar failures in foreign policy, their administrations’ reactions to their respective
crises uncovered very different priorities
of character. Despite Carter knowing that
the Iran hostage crisis would destroy his
political career, he worked obsessively to
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VANDERBILT POLITICAL REVIEW
secure the hostages’ release and did not
attempt to deflect responsibility. He was
still directing negotiations fifteen minutes
before Ronald Reagan assumed office – up
until the First Lady forced him to shave
and change clothing in order to greet the
new President. Despite the myth that the
hostages were released simply as a result
of Reagan’s victory, it was actually the
Algiers Accord that secured the hostages’
release. Carter and his special negotiator
Warren Christopher had worked tirelessly
on the deal and as a result, as Reagan was
lunching after his inauguration, Carter and
Christopher received confirmation from
Tehran that the hostages had lifted off.
In contrast to Carter, the Obama administration’s prime concern was deflection.
Hillary Clinton tried to wash her hands of
the murder by claiming that such trivial
matters as ambassadorial security end up
lost in the bureaucracy. Carter could have
employed the same defense but had the
moral scruple to accept responsibility as
the Comm