Under Construction @ Keele 2019 summer 2019, vol 5 issue 1 | Page 24

Givens and Luedtke’s assessment of the roles of a number of governments (Germany,
France, and the UK) and their national preferences works to the overall advantage of the
analysis. This is a critical evaluation for understanding the roles of domestic social groups and
individuals during the agenda-setting process, as they inform decisions taken by national
governments to ‘either block harmonization altogether or allow only restrictive
harmonization’ at the EU level. 14 This works further to their advantage as it gives a robust
explanation for why certain policies are blocked over others: a result of the changeable nature
of the political salience of an issue. 15 While Menz agrees that national governments act
rationally—in line with LIG and RCI approaches—he positions himself away from ‘national-
level influences’ and instead, emphasises how member states strategically delegate certain
powers to the Commission, discussed further below.
In order to illustrate delegation, Menz makes a meaningful attempt to analyse why
‘principals’ (member states) relinquish sovereignty to the ‘agent’ (the Commission) in the case
of mobility agreements. This, he hypothesises, is because of the agent’s ability to overcome
‘incomplete contracting’, encourage adherence to partnerships, and help to resolve issues of
credibility. 16 His findings resonate with the broader literature, specifically the works of Mark
Pollack, who challenges the role of institutions. For example, he claims that institutions may
‘assume’ roles that were not ‘originally anticipated’. 17 This is important in connection to
Menz’s argument since it captures how member states have benefited from delegating
powers to the Commission. Typical to RCI, Menz’s preoccupation with where political
delegation occurs means that he devotes little attention to the internal dynamics and
14
Givens and Luedtke, “The Politics of the European Union,” 151.
Givens and Luedtke, “The Politics of the European Union,” 150.
16
Menz, “The promise of principal-agent approach,” 315-6.
17
Mark Pollack, “Delegation, agency and agenda-setting in the European Community,” International
Organization 51, 1 (1997): 99-134.
15
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