Under Construction @ Keele 2019 summer 2019, vol 5 issue 1 | Page 23

state behaviour by using a principal-agent approach, a prominent model of RCI. 9 He does this
in three ways. First, he looks at the advantages of delegation during EU negotiations with third
countries, which then allows him to engage with concepts of shirking (when agencies deviate
from the principal’s goal) and slippage (when the very structure of delegation provides
incentives for the agent to behave in ways inimical to the preferences of the principal)—
essential aspects of the principal-agent approach—to analyse why member states rely on the
Commission for certain policies. 10 Third, he outlines agency as a ‘contractual relationship’
between member states and the EU: member states pursued bilateral agreements because
of a lack of trust in EU initiatives. 11
These articles converge on control policy. Specifically, both acknowledge control to be
of high political importance and, agree that policy developments in this area are driven by the
‘preferences’ of member states. 12 13 Furthermore, they also agree that member states have
got around the constraints of the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
However, they do differ on their explanations of how these preferences are formed; why
member states resist EU institutions, and; more generally, how immigration policy has
developed. This is, largely, because each article attends to various parts of the immigration
policy-making process. More specifically, this is a result of the different levels of influence
they assign to national governments in the case of LIG, and to supranational institutions in
the case of RCI.
9
Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, “The principal-agent approach and the study of the European Union:
promise unfulfilled?” Journal of European Public Policy 10, 1 (2003): 121-139.
10
Menz, “The promise of principal-agent approach,” 315-318.
11
Menz, “The promise of principal-agent approach,” 319.
12
Givens and Luedtke, “The Politics of the European Union,” 153.
13
Menz, “The promise of principal-agent approach,” 313.
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