The Sevenoaks School Journal of Philosophy - Volume Two APORIAii_digitalversion - Volume 2 | Page 6

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IS MORALITY RELATIVE ?
which is regarded as moral in the given society. Furthermore, under the condi-
tions of moral relativism, no one holds the moral high ground nor is any interna-
tional intervention justifiable. This essay will now consider the contemporary
example of Shia genocide that is being carried out by the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (hence ISIL). A significant note at this point is to say that in-
deed ISIL believe that genocide in this case is the right thing to do on the
grounds of their amoral belief, that other people preach Islam in the wrong way.
This belief is how they justify why Shi’ites do not deserve to live. Although, in
other countries Shi’ites would be regarded as worthy of living as all other Mus-
lims. This highlights that the debate here is about the beliefs that lead them to
amoral actions, rather than moral principles such as whether killing innocent
people is wrong. I insist that this exposes a significant nuance: it may be the case
that in different cultures the beliefs differ, which underpin people’s motiva-
tions—but moral principles do not. In that case, the incentive for one to respect
and be tolerant towards the mere beliefs of another society seem to be very poor.
Moreover, this leaves room for the existence of absolute moral principles
that can be universalised: one may still be able to think through our moral prin-
ciples with reason and apply thought experiments in order to reach a basic ab-
solute moral guide. In addition, by adopting the stance of a moral relativist for
the reason that it tolerates others, one seems to elevate the value of tolerance to
an absolute. With the same reasoning, one ought to also tolerate the abuse of
human rights, which seems incredibly suspicious. In response, a moral relativist
could reply that human rights are also a concept based on Western values,
therefore it is not a universal standard that we may impose on other countries
that hold alternative values. However, some argue that human rights are indeed
grounded in the concept of natural laws that belong to every person. Therefore,
it can be concluded that human rights exist independently of political views. For
the purposes of this essay, I will not further generalise, but it may be the case
that a general consensus on morality can be reached in the same way the debate
on human rights has boiled down to universal natural principles. Thus, the
premise that we ought to tolerate others seems overly-permissible, and it does
not warrant the absence of an absolute moral code.
APORIA: The Sevenoaks School Journal of Philosophy, Vol. II, Publication date: August 2018.