11 CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONSEQUENCES
II
This distinction is a case of moral agency versus causality , what we call the Control Principle . 8 Our actions are only considered to be an issue of morality if they are acted through our own agency - I state that I am a moral agent so actions I intend may have moral benefits or repercussions . For example : if I had intended to kill someone as opposed to someone who accidentally drove into someone , I would be more morally culpable because intent has a driving factor of purpose that is much more dangerous . 9 However , in the case of the driver , I cannot say that I intended for the child to run across the road and into my car ; that is a case of causality that is out of my control . The driver cannot control the child ’ s agency and so this factor of circumstance can change the view of my actions from the perspective of the onlooker . What the onlooker initially intuits is that the killer is more blameworthy because of the harm that he has caused however we cannot say that his agency caused that action of harm . What we can only accept for both of these drivers is their act of wrongdoing which is the consumption of alcohol soon before driving . It follows from all these arguments that they are equal in levels of culpability if we are to accept the control principle . 10
Thus the dichotomy between legal and moral culpability arises . Does the result of harm mean that we impose a harsher punishment on the killer or are we to base all our punishments on wrongdoing ? It seems that the legal implications misalign with the moral implications as they shift blame far too much towards the driver who has killed the child . We can accept that the wrongdoing is categorically incorrect but to assign more punishment to the “ killer ” would seem to cross into tricky moral boundaries as noted by the issue of circumstance . But should we care about the control principle ? I will argue for a system of punishment to ensure two things : a consideration of the control principle but not a need to revise practices entirely , along with a harsher system of deterrence .
Although both are seen to be morally culpable , the practical aspect of punishing both of them in the same way would be too contentious . Think of a similar issue : if there were two tired drivers and one happened to cause damage to a car while the other got away unscathed , does that mean we punish all tired drivers ? We cannot feasibly base our system on an acceptance of the control principle , that would include a total overhaul of our legal system , thus we should base it on actual outcomes in this case .