The Sevenoaks School Journal of Philosophy - Volume Two APORIAii_digitalversion - Volume 2 | Page 13

C EDRIC T AN
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we associate the two with a causal connection: we state that something is wrong
because it causes harm; something which is felt whether it be physical or psy-
chological. However, this definition falls short of causality in certain cases, for
example, the case of talking behind someone’s back. Assuming that the victim of
the insults does not hear the insults, is this causing harm? In this case, the act of
wrongdoing - which we can all accept - does not provide a causal link to tangi-
ble harm of the victim. 6
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Therefore, in the case of our two drivers, we can state something similar. Al-
though they both committed the acts of wrongdoing, we cannot say they both
had the intention of doing harm. They understand that their acts could lead to
harm but this does not necessarily recognise the circumstance of location and
luck. We can recognise at the fundamental level that these two drivers are
equally morally culpable, that is a given. It just happens to be the case that one
driver had the unfortunate coincidence of the child running into his car whilst
the other happened to be in another location.
APORIA: The Sevenoaks School Journal of Philosophy, Vol. II, Publication date: August 2018.