NEW JERSEY POLICE CHIEF MAGAZINE OCTOBER 2026
fentanyl, personal-use amounts of prescription drugs, hundreds of dollars in cash, and blue straws.
Birry was indicted on three counts arising from the traffic stop:( 1) possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance,( 2) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and( 3) unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. In the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Birry moved to suppress the evidence found during the stop, challenging both the length of the stop and the scope of the search. The District Court denied the motion, finding the duration of the stop and the scope of the search constitutionally permissible. Birry entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed to the Third Circuit.
THE THIRD CURCUIT’ S DECISION
The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’ s denial of Birry’ s motion to suppress, holding that both the stop and the search were constitutional. The Court concluded that the officers’ questioning and actions stayed within the permissible bounds of a traffic stop and that the search did not exceed the scope of Birry’ s consent.
Duration of the stop
The Court began with the duration of the traffic stop, reiterating that“[ t ] he reasonable duration of a traffic stop is based on its dual missions: to‘ address the traffic violation that warranted the stop’ and to‘ attend to related safety concerns.’” 2 Under Third Circuit precedent,“ an unlawful seizure occurs when an officer( 1) diverts from the infraction-and-safety-based mission of the stop to investigate other criminal conduct,( 2) in a way that meaningfully prolongs the stop, and( 3) the investigative detour is unsupported by any independent reasonable suspicion.” 3
On appeal, Birry argued that the officers went off mission as soon as Officer Pratt turned his attention to him, even before the officers began questioning him. Birry contended that Officer Pratt should have focused on traffic-related tasks, such as arranging a tow, instead of joining Officer Shaheen and watching Birry as he got out of the car. The Court disagreed. Police may check passengers’ identification and ask them to step out of the car during a traffic stop, 4 and it was not unreasonable for Officer Pratt to support Officer Shaheen while he did so. The officers also took different roles: one asked Birry for information while the other observed his movements. The officers therefore did not go off mission before they began questioning Birry.
The Court then turned to the questioning itself, applying the framework from its decision in Ross, which sorts traffic-stop questions into four categories:( 1) small talk,( 2) infraction-related inquiries,( 3) safety-related inquiries, and( 4) off-mission inquiries. 5 The first three categories are“ on mission”; the fourth is not.
Before the search, Officer Pratt asked Birry four questions:“ How do you know this guy?”“ Do you know him, like, or?”“ Where’ s he giving you a ride from?” and“ Oh, okay, so you’ re going back to Wilkes-Barre?” Officer Shaheen asked,“ Do you have an ID on you, brother?”“ You don’ t have a driver’ s license on you, do you?” and“ Do you have anything in your pockets?”
The Court explained that these questions were neither small talk nor infraction-related inquiries.“ Once a license check confirms a driver’ s authorization to operate the vehicle, further questioning of his passenger goes‘ beyond ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop.’” The questions were irrelevant to“ assessing whether the driver is legally on the road,” because the officers already knew he was not, and irrelevant to“ processing the ticket.”
The Court held, however, that the questions were related to officer safety, which the Third Circuit has described as“ mission critical.” The driver appeared to have an outstanding arrest warrant. While the officers waited for confirmation, it was reasonable to ask Birry about his relationship with Brallier as a safety precaution. Learning why Birry was traveling with Brallier helped the officers“ assess potential risks involved … and gauge what additional precautions may be necessary.” Officer Shaheen’ s question about what Birry had in his pockets fell squarely into the safety-related category as well. The officers therefore did not go off mission while questioning Birry, and the duration of the stop was constitutionally sound.
Scope of the consent search
The Court next addressed Birry’ s argument that the evidence should have been suppressed because the search exceeded the scope of his consent. Birry argued that the request was framed as a pockets-only check for weapons and that he never agreed to a full-body pat-down. The Court examined the search from the moment it began to the moment Officer Shaheen noticed the object in Birry’ s pant leg, and held that it did not exceed the scope of his consent.
Birry might have limited his consent to a search of his pockets, the Court explained, but he did not. Although the exchange began with a focus on Birry’ s pockets, Officer Pratt eventually asked in general terms whether he had anything illegal on him. And although Birry offered to let the officers check his pockets, they did not accept that offer. Instead, Officer Shaheen asked to search Birry generally, not just his pockets. Birry’ s answer was similarly general: he said there was nothing on him, not just nothing in his pockets. The Court found that a“ typical reasonable person” would have understood from the exchange that the request to search was not limited to Birry’ s pockets.
2 Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U. S. 348, 354, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492( 2015). 3 United States v. Ross, 151 F. 4th 487, 496( 3d Cir. 2025)( citing United States v.
Green, 897 F. 3d 173, 179( 3d Cir. 2018)).
4 See United States v. Hunter, 88 F. 4th 221, 224( 3d Cir. 2023); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 415, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41( 1997). 5 Ross, 151 F. 4th at 494.
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