The NJ Police Chief Magazine - Volume 32, No. 12 | Page 38

NEW JERSEY POLICE CHIEF MAGAZINE SEPTEMBER 2026
saying plainly what must be achieved, what must be avoided, and how much latitude subordinates have, then trusting trained people to execute. It is also an argument for building contingency plans before they are needed. A fallback plan is not pessimism. It is what allows a leader to stay calm.
3. Adaptive Leadership: Chamberlain’ s Decision in Extremity Late on July 2, the far left of the Union line rested on Little Round Top, a rocky, wooded hill held by the 20th Maine Infantry: fewer than 400 men under Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, a 34- year-old former college professor who had been a soldier for less than a year. Alabama regiments under Col. William C. Oates attacked again and again, trying to turn the flank and, with it, possibly the entire Union line. After about ninety minutes of close fighting, the 20th Maine had taken heavy losses and was nearly out of ammunition.
Chamberlain had seconds to decide. He could not retreat; there was no ground to give. He could not hold; his men had almost nothing left to fire. He chose a third option. He ordered bayonets fixed and swung his line downhill like a hinged door into the next assault. At the same moment, Capt. Walter Morrill’ s Company B, posted earlier in a concealed position, opened fire on the Confederate rear, fire that Oates later said his men mistook for a much larger force. The charge broke the attack and secured the flank.
Psychologist Gary Klein’ s research on recognition-primed decision-making, drawn largely from fireground commanders and others who make life-or-death calls without time for analysis, describes what Chamberlain did: quickly matching a collapsing situation to a workable course of action and committing to it fully. Police officers and supervisors operate inside that same decision architecture during rapidly evolving encounters. Chamberlain’ s example is not a celebration of recklessness. It shows that when inaction guarantees failure, a leader must assess quickly, resist paralysis, and act with full commitment, and that the training, awareness, and cohesion built long before the crisis are what make decisive improvisation possible rather than merely lucky.
4. Communication and Alignment: When Disagreement Goes Underground
Gen. Robert E. Lee arrived at Gettysburg confident that his army, fresh from a string of victories, could not be stopped. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, his senior corps commander, disagreed about how to use that advantage. On the evening of July 1 and again on July 2, Longstreet urged Lee to move around the Union left and force Meade to attack on ground of the Confederates’ choosing. Lee refused. As Longstreet later recalled it, Lee told him,“ The enemy is there, and I am going to strike him.”
The disagreement was overruled but never resolved. Longstreet’ s July 2 attack went in late in the afternoon and without the coordination it needed. On July 3, Longstreet objected again, this time to the frontal assault on the Union center that became known
as Pickett’ s Charge, telling Lee, by his own account, that“ no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.” Lee ordered the attack anyway, and it failed at terrible cost. Historians still debate whether Longstreet’ s slow preparations on both days reflected quiet resistance or ordinary friction. The underlying dynamic is not in dispute: a subordinate’ s serious, professional objection was voiced, rejected without real engagement, and then carried out without conviction.
Every chief has seen a version of this failure. Harvard researcher Amy Edmondson’ s work on psychological safety shows that when people with real expertise do not believe their dissent will be heard, they do not stop disagreeing. They stop saying so, and problems that could have been caught early get carried out instead. The lesson is not that leaders must always defer to subordinates who disagree. Sometimes the senior leader is right and must prevail. It is that disagreement has to be surfaced, heard, and either resolved or clearly overruled, not left to fester and quietly degrade execution. A command staff meeting where junior voices go silent the moment the chief states a preference is a warning sign, not evidence of good discipline.
5. Terrain, Preparation, and Logistics It is tempting to remember Gettysburg only through acts of individual courage, but the outcome also turned on fundamentals: position, supply, and preparation. Once Meade’ s army settled onto the fishhook-shaped high ground running from Culp’ s Hill through Cemetery Hill and along Cemetery Ridge to the Round Tops, it held what military theorists call interior lines. Meade could shift troops, ammunition, and reinforcements from one threatened sector to another far faster than Lee could move around the outside of the Union position. Lee, meanwhile, had fought the opening days partly blind, because his cavalry had been out of contact for days.
The advantage extended beyond the field. Union quartermasters kept a rail-connected supply base that sustained the army through the battle. Lee’ s army, deep in enemy territory and dependent on what it could gather, had no such lifeline and faced a dangerous retreat. As historian Kent Masterson Brown has shown, the campaign was decided as much by wagon trains, depots, and rail lines as by any single decision on the field.
For police executives, the lesson is that motivation cannot make up indefinitely for poor preparation. Departments that invest in training, interoperable communications, mutualaid agreements, equipment readiness, and contingency plans are building their own interior lines: the ability to move resources to the point of
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