NEW JERSEY POLICE CHIEF MAGAZINE OCTOBER 2026
LEADERSHIP
Command Under Fire: Six Leadership Lessons from Gettysburg
Timeless insights on decision-making, command presence, and organizational resilience
By Mitchell C. Sklar | NJSACOP Executive Director
Few battles in American history have been studied as closely as Gettysburg, and few offer as much to people who lead under pressure. Fought July 1 – 3, 1863, in the farm country of southcentral Pennsylvania, it was the largest battle ever waged in North America and the turning point of the Civil War. It was also a threeday laboratory of command. Roughly 165,000 soldiers and dozens of commanders made decisions with incomplete intelligence, broken communications, and exhausted troops, and the consequences were counted in tens of thousands of casualties.
Police executives do not fight with rifles and artillery, but they share more with those commanders than most leadership case studies admit. They decide with incomplete information. Their people are spread across a wide area and reachable only imperfectly. Their chain of command must keep working even when the person at the top is new. And their organizations stay composed under strain largely because their leaders do. The commanders at Gettysburg left behind six lessons that apply directly to the chief’ s office, and none of them requires a history degree to put to work on Monday morning.
1. Rapid Assessment: The First Leader on Scene Shapes What Follows
On the morning of July 1, Brig. Gen. John Buford commanded about 2,700 Union cavalrymen at the crossroads town of Gettysburg. He did not know the war’ s largest battle was about to begin there, but he knew the ground. The evening before, he had ridden the terrain himself, questioned local civilians, and checked his own picket lines instead of relying only on reports. He saw that the ridges west of town offered a series of defensible fallback positions and that the roads converging on Gettysburg made the town vital to whichever army held it.
Outnumbered several times over by the approaching Confederate infantry, Buford dismounted his troopers, arranged them in an elastic defense in depth, and fought a delaying action to buy time for Maj. Gen. John Reynolds’ infantry to arrive and claim the high ground. He did it without orders and without any guarantee help would come in time. It worked, and historians still count those hours among the most consequential of the battle.
Buford applied, instinctively, what strategist John Boyd would describe a century later as the OODA loop: observe, orient, decide, act. He gathered his own information, made sense of it quickly, decided under uncertainty, and acted early. The parallel for policing is direct. The first supervisor at a barricaded-subject call, a mass-casualty incident, or a fast-moving disturbance rarely has complete information or time to get it. What that supervisor does in the first minutes, setting a perimeter, identifying defensible ground, and communicating clearly, often decides whether the incident stabilizes or spirals. Buford’ s example argues for training first-line supervisors to make those calls without waiting for permission, and for a culture that backs sound judgment afterward instead of second-guessing every imperfect outcome.
2. Command Intent: Meade’ s Clarity in Chaos
Maj. Gen. George G. Meade did not choose the timing of his test. Before dawn on June 28, three days before the battle, a messenger from Washington woke him. Meade later admitted he first assumed he was being arrested. Instead, he learned that President Lincoln had removed Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker and given Meade command of the Army of the Potomac, whose corps were scattered across dozens of miles of Maryland and Pennsylvania roads.
Meade responded with what modern military doctrine calls commander’ s intent: a clear statement of purpose, desired end state, and the limits within which subordinates may use their own judgment, so the mission can continue even when communications fail. Within days he issued the Pipe Creek Circular, a contingency plan that identified a fallback defensive line in Maryland, with routes and assignments for every corps, to be used only if a fight at Gettysburg proved unfavorable. Meade never fully executed it. Once Buford and Reynolds showed the ground could be held, he committed to Gettysburg. But the plan’ s existence shows a new commander who, rather than freezing or micromanaging, stated his intent, built in flexibility, and trusted corps commanders he barely knew to carry it out.
Chiefs meet this test when they are sworn in during a crisis, when a watch commander inherits a shift already under way, or when a critical incident moves faster than the chain of command can be briefed. Meade’ s lesson is that a leader’ s most valuable contribution in those moments is not directing every unit. It is
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