IV. THE REALITY OF SECURITY WITHIN THE AFGHAN
COUNTERINSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT
VVFrom the earlier statements, the argument that security cannot properly materialize without development should be apparent. However, additional evidence supporting this notion can be found in the failures that have defined the NATO experience in Afghanistan. If we analyze the strategy that went into Afghanistan with the normative view from earlier in this article, we can clearly see the need for policy reform and the need to have security and development work in synchronization. If we look into the history of the recent conflict we can see an originally light security footprint that was extremely effective at destroying the military opposition16. One acquaintance in I met in Afghanistan, Matt Trevithick, described how in the opening stages of the intervention had Panshiri Northern Alliance fighters charging on horseback armed with AK-47 rifles and laser pointers at Taliban defenses. When combining the versatility of the Afghan anti-Taliban fighters and the firepower of the US Air force the NATO coalition removed most pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in a few weeks. However, this relatively easy entry into the conflict did not last long. The diplomatic agreements in the Bonn Convention and the later political reforms that were installed were not representative of the domestic demographics. Members of Tajik, Panjshiri, and Hazara populations that were anti-Taliban were selected for key political positions and sponsored by foreign regimes. However, these leaders ultimately proved to only inflame pre-existing civil war ethnic tensions between Pashtuns and minority groups in Afghanistan (Harrison: 2009). In addition, the aid efforts made into Afghanistan have been extremely fragmented, and led by top down initiatives that promote pragmatic consolidation on the ground and corruptive inefficiency17, 14. Fragmentation is also present across NATO members. Training methods, salaries, and tactics have been presented differently throughout the conflict by each organizing entity (USAID, NGO’s. European Governments, UNAMA, etc.). The result of this has led to an ineffective government that is rife with patronage, corruption, and has the public perception as a western puppet 16. Moreover, aid and governance changes have not affected the poorest and most politically and economically disadvantaged areas of Afghan society, but only created additional animosity and inequality 15. As a result it is no mystery as to why the insurgency continues to thrive in Afghanistan since many do not have a democratic way to express their frustration at the lack of socio-economic alternatives
8816. Barfield: 2010
8817. Kandiyoti: 2009
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