Greece have been highlighted, but this phenomenon has been observed as well in Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Romania, and the United Kingdom53 – members states of the EU, and some of which are traditionally thought of as ideal host countries.
VVFinally, some weight should also be given to ideas of nationalism: both ethnic identity, as well as state or civic identity. Tepfenhart argues that the predominant identity is constructed based on how a state is created; state nationalism is encouraged by an existing state that created itself by assimilating other groups, and ethnic nationalism is encouraged by communities which want to be recognized as nations but do not have a state54. This seems to suggest that states with a significant minority or multiethnic population are predestined to experience difficulties with the groups within their borders. Fox and Vermeersch go on to claim that the EU’s expansions eastward in 2004 “did not sound the death knoll of nationalism in the region; rather, it signaled its reinvention and, in some respects, reinvigoration”55. Particularly in Hungary and Poland, nationalism has been redefined, inter-party competition has revolved around each party’s interpretation of the ‘nation’, and radical nationalist organizations are defining themselves in opposition to the EU56.
VVThis paper has aimed to analyze the various factors of ethnic conflicts, and whether post-conflict integration efforts in the EU have been fruitful in creating a sustainable peace. Significant attention has been given to Hungary since it seems to be a fulcrum for various rising issues around ethnic tensions, xenophobia, the empowerment of the radical right, and in anti-EU sentiments. However, Poland, Greece, and to a lesser extent France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are also experiencing an increase in intolerance for minority groups. Whether this is a reflection of the post-financial crisis recovery period, or a sign of times to come, remains to be seen. In the states with recent memory of conflict, some process of transitional justice would be fruitful, in tandem with EU measures, to develop a post-conflict rhetoric and quell rivalries and tensions with “other” groups. Power-sharing measures, as well as Horowitz’s argument for constitution building, may also be effective in states where there are large and permanent minority populations. As argued in this paper, for the EU to curb these behaviours by its member states that contradict its own mission outlined in its Charter, it must exercise its soft power and take decisive action in the mechanisms within its member states, rather than exclusively focusing on states still in the accession process.
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53. Halasz 2009
54. Tepfenhart 2013
55. Fox and Vermeersch p.325
56. Fox and Vermeersch 2010