The Journal Of Political Studies Volume I, No. 2, Jan. 2014 | Page 29

traditional groups”14. Following common logic on urban demographics, this conclusion seems reasonable – the multiculturalism prevalent in major cities such as London, Paris, and Berlin seem to be proponents to this fact. Modernization, including aspects of urbanization, promotes education and socializes tolerance15; they find that “empirical research on ethnic intolerance and prejudice is regularly producing results that are consistent with the modernization approach”16. However, Budapest, Athens, and Warsaw are not global capitals exhibiting as widespread multicultural populations. The distribution of intolerance across Europe leans heavier in the east- and southeastern European states more then in the West.

VVTepfenhart suggests that there are four major sources of ethnic conflict: weak states, political issues, economic issues, and cultural issues17. The primary example she uses is the former Yugoslavia, where the weak state environment allowed ethnic conflict to emerge. As the Soviet Union collapsed and a number of referenda took place in Yugoslavia to determine its future, “individual groups suddenly had a security dilemma regarding their life in the future”18. Again, this highlights the subsystem interplay within the region and their immediate security concerns, as illustrated in regional security complex theory19. James Fearon argues that the main causes of ethnic conflict arise from commitments – tensions escalate when political communities are experience rising tensions and have no mediating third party to guarantee agreements20.

VVIt is important to look at transitional justice and power-sharing frameworks in assessing initiatives to reduce ethnic tensions. Subotic’s “triple accountability” concept[1], involving individual, state, and societal responsibilities in order to provide a sustainable reconciliation process and effective justice framework. This will be illustrated, followed by Bieber’s analysis of “functionality and dysfunctionality”[2] of power-sharing institutions and finally, Horowitz’s emphasis on constitution-building processes will be outlined.

95

14. Strabac et al. 2012 p.461

15. Strabac et al. 2012

16. Ibid, p.461

17. Tepfenhart 2013

18. Ibid. p.88

19. Buzan and Waever 2003

20. Fearon 1994