The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment | Page 16

Despite these clear policy statements, the empirical evidence shows a mixed record by the DOS in ensuring policy and budget coherence among civilian
agencies, or even among its own bureaus, during the
years that followed. To paraphrase one senior DOS
official, the State Department found itself hamstrung
between its traditional, state-to-state relationships on
the one hand, and the need to develop mechanisms to
address the growing number of regional – as opposed
to bilateral – national security issues and actors on the
other.28 These actors included a plethora of U.S. agencies involved in international affairs that operated
outside of the jurisdiction and direction of the DOS,
but whose representatives generally coordinated their
work at the country level as part of U.S. embassy country teams chaired by the U.S. ambassador or another
senior DOS official.29
As part of its duties under NSPD-44, S/CRS set
about trying to expand upon this DOS-led coordination system for R&S contingencies. S/CRS proposed a three-tiered interagency management system
(IMS), with coordination bodies working in tandem
in Washington, at the DOD’s geographic combatant
commands or equivalent regional platforms, and in
support of the local country team or teams, where
applicable. Despite technical assistance from JFCOM
and the NSC’s endorsement of IMS on 7 March 2007,
S/CRS ultimately failed to embed the new structure
into interagency operations. IMS proved unable to
overcome resistance among DOS bureaus and skepticism from U.S. ambassadors, who saw few problems
with the existing system in which they played leading
roles.30 Two years later, the incoming Obama White
House reorganized and expanded the national security staff, which eventually absorbed the DOS’s policy

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