The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment | Page 15

bility operations.26 In the ensuing years, a significant
drawdown of U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan
has taken place despite the ongoing stabilization challenges in both countries. Because the Obama White
House has not updated R&S policy guidance, much of
the current organization, doctrine, authority, resourcing, and personnel architecture related to these tasks
are legacies of the Bush second term. In personal interviews, analysts and practitioners described a sense
of drift and attenuation during the intervening years,
leading some to conclude that NSPD-44’s aims went
entirely unfulfilled. However, the reality is more complicated.
The rest of this paper picks up the story from 2009
to the present, taking stock of civilian agencies’ current R&S capabilities in terms of policy coherence,
planning, civilian surge capacity, and civil-military
coordination.
Improving Policy Coherence in Civilian Agencies’
R&S Efforts
NSPD-44 directed S/CRS to “[e]nsure program
and policy coordination among Departments and
Agencies of the United States Government… [and p]
rovide United States Government decision makers
with detailed options for an integrated United States
Government response in connection with specific R&S
operations.” It also directed other U.S. federal departments and agencies to “[c]oordinate with S/CRS during budget formulation for relevant R&S activities
prior to submission to [the Office of Management and
Budget] and the Congress or as required to coordinate
reconstruction and stabilization activities.”27

8