能获得中国政府对外投资批准的反向违约金。若买方
认为其贷款人(在债务融资的情况下）一旦获得政府批
准便非常可能为某项交易提供融资，此种做法很合理。
若获得批准的可能性较小，但融资金额不小，则必须为
融资失败支付更高反向违约金的风险将会较大。
强制执行风险：风险性质
中国对外投资交易中的买方和投资对象必须克服各种
障碍，使得其合同在理论上和实践中都可以强制执行。
首先，中国和美国尚未签订条约，规定共同认可和商业
案件中法院判决的强制执行。然而，中国是纽约仲裁
公约的签约国，根据此公约，中国必须认可外国仲裁裁
决。因此，各方当事人一般选择通过仲裁解决争议，即
使其更倾向于选择诉讼。遗憾的是，在中国强制执行仲
裁裁决成本高，耗时长。外国交易方担心当地歧视。即
使中国法院认可外国仲裁裁决的有效性和中国在纽约
公约下的义务，我们无法保证仲裁裁决约定会被强制
执行。例如，一项要求中国买方必须完成交易的外国仲
裁裁决在实际中可能特别难以强制执行。
基于国家发展和改革委员会对外投资规定第25条的影
响引发了一项更加根本的挑战。 4 该条款禁止中国对外
投资者在交易经国家发展和改革委员会批准之前签订
“最终且具有法律约束力的”交易协议，除非协议规定，
其只有在获得此等批准后才会生效。尽管该条款似乎
尚未经中国法院检验，可能会对外国交易方在其获得
国家发展和改革委员会批准之前根据中国交易方违反
交易协议强制执行外国仲裁裁决构成重大障碍。
A buyer can try to persuade a
wary target by offering either a
high premium or a high reverse
termination fee.
it to recognize foreign arbitral awards. Parties thus
generally opt for dispute resolution through arbitration,
even if they would otherwise prefer litigation.
Unfortunately, enforcing arbitral awards in China can be
costly and time-consuming. Foreign parties fear local
bias. And even if Chinese courts recognize the validity of
a foreign arbitral award and China’s obligations under
the New York Convention, there is no guarantee that
the award will be enforced. A foreign award requiring a
Chinese buyer to close a transaction, for example, may be
particularly hard to enforce in practice.
A more fundamental challenge arises under Article 25 of
NDRC’s outbound regulations. 4 Such provision prohibits
a Chinese outbound investor from entering into a “final
and legally binding” transaction agreement before NDRC
approves the transaction, unless the agreement provides
that it will become effective only upon receipt of such
approval. Although this provision seems yet to have been
tested in Chinese courts, it likely poses a substantial barrier
to a foreign party enforcing a foreign award based on
Chinese party’s breach of a transaction agreement prior to
its receipt of NDRC’s approval.
RISK ALLOCATION
风险分摊
如上所述，中国对外投资交易通常使用境外担保，信用
证或存管资金为履行反向解约金义务提供支持。若投
资对象可以利用此等文书或账户，同时不申请在中国强
制执行，且相关裁定机构未对相关义务在中国的可强
制执行性进行评估，则可以在很大程度上避免强制执
行风险。
遗憾的是，对于在协议签署时在中国境外几乎没有资
金的买方，签订境外担保函或信用证，或如上所述向境
外托管账户存入资金可能很困难。在此等情况下，提供
更高金额的交易保费可能是买方解决交易对象关于可
强制执行性的担忧的最佳方法。为尽可能提高上述风
险谈判成功的可能性，中国买方和美国投资对象可以
采取若干一般措施。在谈判开始之前，试图了解拟定交
易中的风险，即使是在你的交易对象面临最大风险的
情况下。制定谈判计划。与你的交易对象一起尽可能坦
诚地解决风险。在谈判过程中了解风险可能会有损信
任，各方通过合作可以确定创造性解决方案，扫除互利
交易的上述和其他障碍。
WWW.THECHINAINVESTOR.COM
As noted above, Chinese outbound deals commonly use
offshore guarantees, letters of credit, or escrow funds to
support reverse termination fee obligations. If the target
can draw on such instruments or accounts without
seeking enforcement in China, and without the applicable
adjudicating body assessing the enforceability in China
of the underlying obligation, enforcement risks can be
largely avoided. Unfortunately, for buyers with few assets
outside of China at the time of signing, entering into an
offshore guarantee or letter of credit or, as noted above,
funding an offshore escrow account may be difficult. In
such cases, offering a higher deal premium may be the
buyer’s best approach to addressing the target’s concerns
about enforceability.
To maximize the chances of successfully negotiating the
foregoing risks, Chinese buyers and U.S. targets can take
several general steps. Before negotiations start, seek to
understand the risks in the contemplated transaction,
even when it is your counterparty who will be most
exposed. Develop a plan for negotiations. And address
the risk s as forthrightly as possible with your counterparty.
Learning of risks in course of negotiations can undermine
trust. Whereas working together can allow parties to
identify creative solutions and to clear these and other
impediments to mutually beneficial transactions.
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