风险分摊
中国对外投资的交易协议一般解决与第三方融资相关 的风险, 具体如下: 买方在签署协议时会声明相应的承 诺函有效, 而且, 如果进行了融资, 其将会有足够资金 进行交易交割 。 买方会同意尽其最大努力获得承诺函 中所述的融资, 如果无法获得此等融资, 则会寻求其他 融资 。 买方履行交易交割的义务不会以其获得初期或 其他融资为前提条件 。 交易对象具有单方面终止交易 的权利, 若买方未能完成交易, 尽管买方的所有条件均 已满足, 且投资对象声明其愿意交割, 交易对象可以要 求买方支付反向解约金 。
若买方因融资失败未能完成交易, 很多协议明确规 定, 交易对象不能请求强制履行, 以强制买方完成交 易 。 投资对象的唯一可以采取的措施是强制履行买方 寻求其他融资( 买方可能仍未获得其他融资) 的承诺, 或者终止协议, 收取反向解约金 。 当融资风险提高时, 例如当融资方的承诺受到大量条件的限制, 投资对象 会要求提高反向解约金或交易保费 。
当投资对象特别关注融资风险时, 中国投资者可以考 虑为融资失败提供更高金额的反向违约金, 且高于未
When financing risks are heightened, such as when the financing party’ s commitment is subject to a wide range of conditions, targets demand larger reverse termination fees or a greater deal premium.
When a target is particularly concerned about financing risk, Chinese investors may consider offering a larger reverse termination fee for a financing failure than for the failure to obtain Chinese government outbound approvals. Doing so makes sense if the buyer thinks that its lenders( in the case of a debt financing) are highly likely to finance a deal once it has obtained its government approvals. If the likelihood of receiving the approvals but not the financing is small, then so will be the risk of having to pay the higher fee for the financing failure.
ENFORCEMENT RISK: NATURE OF THE RISK
Buyers and targets in Chinese outbound investment transactions must navigate various impediments to making their contracts enforceable, both in theory and in practice. First, China and the United States have yet to execute a treaty providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of court judgments in commercial cases. China is, however, a signatory to the New York Arbitration Convention, which requires
19 THE CHINA INVESTOR