CONSENT AND ORIGINAL CONTRACT 57
and not from any formulated general set of laws, then each action by the ruler in such
fledging states would have been carried out in an isolated manner. Hume (1987: 468)
argues that actions which have a beneficial result for the population would have
become more and more frequent until eventually it became habitual. This is how he
thinks that the citizens would have come to know the laws within their societies, their
duties and obligations and the origins of rule and justice. In fact, Hardin (2007: 105107) goes as far as to attribute to Hume the notion that these laws, and the first buds
of governmental authority, have their origin in sociological principles. To this extent,
we can see that Hume’s account is at odds with the view of other social contract
theorists, such as John Locke (1947: 186) and Hobbes (2008: 88), who argue instead
that obligations arise through a pact, which constitutes a contract, between the ruler
and the citizens. Through such a pact, it is claimed by these other social contract
thinkers that citizens, in forfeiting their natural liberty in return for their protection,
are bound by duties and obligations to obey the state; and this is how government is
legitimised. Nonetheless, Hume’s (1987: 468-469) account is more convincing
because, as he states, human beings would not agree to be ruled and bound by duties
whe n they are not granted protection and security by the state - and in such a fledging
civilisation no such state, which could grant this protection, would have existed.
Instead, a trial and error method through which people come to know which actions
have beneficial consequences, the state as a whole is a much more likely source of
duty and obligation. Indeed, Hardin (2009: 132) is correct when he writes that
Hume’s account is much more richly grounded in coordination and convention.
Hume (1987: 481) thinks that utility or general human interests are a major part of
what motivates us (especially when it comes to forming or abiding by governmental
rule). Thus, Hume differs to Hobbes (2008: 86-95) who states that a rational man will
submit his natural liberty to an absolute sovereign through the use of reason alone.
Hume (1987: 481) instead argues empirically that, by observing over a period of time
that fulfilling duties to the state creates the best results, man should continue to do so
while this is the case. Indeed, Hume’s account even allows for rebellion in cases
where the government does not maximise utility for a society, whereas Hobbes’ ideas
about complete submission do not.