56 CRAIG HENDERSON
original contract. As an empiricist, Hume grants, when observing human nature and
the equality of persons in a state of nature, that the fledgling civilisations could only
have been formed by people wilfully surrendering their natural liberty and allowing
themselves to be made answerable to their peers through the formulation of laws
(Hume 1987: 468). Hume’s sentiments here, on human beings exiting the state of
nature in such a way echoes the views of his contemporary Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(2014: 102-103) and his account of human beings becoming social creatures as a
means to preserve their own existence (albeit in Hume’s case this is in order to
protect their small-scale societies from the attack of others). For Hume, this original
contract is the only occasion where humans voluntarily consent to the forfeit of their
natural freedom in return for the benefits that come from being a citizen in a state.
Even in such a case, Hume notes that this is not consent in its purest form and instead,
it must surely have arisen from some form of a persuasive nature. His reasoning here
is that, without the existence of a force dominant enough to curb unrest and nonconforming behaviour, there would not have been the means to attain or form a civil
government (1987: 468-469). In this case, though, there are doubts as to whether
Hume is necessarily correct. His belief that human beings in a state of nature exist
more or less equally with regards to mental faculties, for example, suggests that
savage man would have lacked the necessary intelligence to persuade the majority to
forfeit their natural freedom. So, while not contradictory, this claim of persuasion is
somewhat contentious given Hume’s account of human beings existing in the state of
nature. This is not crucial to Hume’s argument, however, and this merely shows us
that we cannot discount entirely the notion that the original governments in fledgling
civilisations were formed on a pure form of consent free from manipulation or
persuasion.
Nevertheless, regardless of this, it seems plainly obvious that Hume’s claim that it is
beyond savage man to be able to form a sophisticated pact or agreement is
compelling. It is here that we observe Hume’s empiricist method through the central
role he gives to custom and tradition with regards to securing the cooperation of the
people. For, if we assume that savage man would have dealt solely in the particular