34 CLAIRE BRESCHARD
2006, Sharma 2009). The lack of preparation for the aftermath of the war is
symptomatic of an overall American and British misunderstanding to understand the
cultural realities (meaning the social, economic, political and cultural background) in
Iraq. The coalition underestimated key elements on the ground and lacked
intelligence, especially on the variety of factions (Berdal and Ucko 2009); it also
ignored the difficulty of making the transition from an armed conflict to a
peacekeeping operation (Ansari 2006). It exemplifies a new type of conflict
intervention which, under the pretence of bringing democracy to a host nation,
distances itself from traditional peacekeeping operations and moves towards peace
enforcement and state-building. With a new paradigm of global politics since the end
of the Cold War, major powers have modified their approach towards peacekeeping.
Although this qualitative shift can be observed in practice, its theorisation is still
lacking, and the planning of operations suffers from this blurred distinction between
the concepts of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and state-building. This proves
problematic as mainstream peace and conflict studies tend to consider failed states as
the main source of conflict and the international community seeks to bring peace via
state-building.
Through a case study of the Iraq War, this paper analyses the challenges of a new
type of peacekeeping operation directed towards peace enforcement and statebuilding. When analysing the outcome of such operations, mainstream theory focuses
on the structural condition of the host state; although this is an important element, this
paper will focus on the psycho-cultural dimension of the conflict, an element too
often omitted from mainstream conflict theory and practice. This approach helps
understanding the participants’ perspective on the conflict, a key element in conflict
transformation. The first section, a quick overview of the evolution of peacekeeping
and state-building, will help situate the coalition’s intervention within a theoretical
framework. Secondly, it is impossible to understand this war without contextualising
it within the Global War on Terrorism. This section explores how the opposing
worldviews of the Iraqis and of the members of the coalition hampered the peace
process. Having situated the war within theoretical and political contexts, it will look
at how the amalgam between the concepts of peacekeeping, outright military