33
The Iraq War: New Perspectives on the Global
War on Terrorism, Peacekeeping and StateBuilding
CLAIRE BRESCHARD1
Since the first UN peacekeeping mission of 1956, concepts of
peacekeeping, state-building and peace enforcement have become
blurred. This can be observed through a case study of the Iraq War and
its aftermath. This paper analyses the American-led coalition’s
approaches to peacekeeping and state-building and its changes over time.
Key to understanding shifting policies are contrasting cultural and
political concepts of the Americans and the Iraqis, an element often
omitted by mainstream conflict theory and practice.
Introduction
The war in Iraq offers a fascinating case of failed state-building by an external party.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration launched its ‘Global War on
Terrorism’ and led a coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003. The aim of the invasion,
codenamed Operation Iraq Freedom, was to topple Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist state.
The reasons given to the international community were the protection of American
security at home and to secure American interests in the region, allegedly threatened
by weapons of mass destruction. The coalition established a democratic regime, but
the expected peaceful outcome to the invasion failed to materialise. Instead, the
coalition had to counter an insurgency that followed the fall of the Ba’athist regime.
The reasons for this failure are numerous: the Americans committed serious mistakes
that hampered any further attempt to bring peace. Scholars agree that a long-term
post-war peace plan was necessary, yet the Bush Administration focused solely on the
conduct of the war and found itself unprepared when the insurgency rose (Ansari
1
Claire Breschard is currently undertaking an MA in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice at
Queen’s University Belfast. Email: [email protected]