Miscalculating the strength and solidarity of the West would simply require Putin to recalculate and sell what could be constituted as a “win” – for example, by acquiring what he claims are the “separatist” regions of Eastern Ukraine – in order to argue such was the original intent all along (which has not happened, as attacks continue against Kyiv and other western cities); miscalculating the length and cost of the war, and the larger spread sanctions would cause on Putin’s inner circle that would in turn challenge his authority, would again simply require a new strategic approach where military action is replaced with softer, more traditional initiatives involving ideological, political, economic, and technological subterfuge, which would allow for sanctions to be lifted and billions of dollars of assets hidden by Putin and his cronies to again be accessed (which has not happened).
Equally, if Putin was paranoid or physically ill, logic would have it that he focus on more immediate personal and national concerns – general wellness, securing what legacy he has for himself and what assets his family and cronies possess, etc. – than on foreign initiatives or goals that may not be achieved in his lifetime; and if he does not believe there is an offramp, all he has to do is listen to members of the western alliance who call for a ceasefire.
As such, using authoritarianism as a model to understand Putin and his actions seems flawed. Providing no insight into the cause of the invasion, the lens of authoritarianism is revealed to be a reactive framework that provides little use in making predictions about the next step or, more importantly, how this will end. All the same, it is for this reason that the West continues to engage in developing coalitions, providing defensive support, imposing sanctions, ramping rhetoric, etc. They are the tools of the trade in “real politics,” defined as that can be as ‘the best options available at the moment.’
Totalitarianism
The revealed limitations of authoritarianism – both as a theoretical model and practical tool for understanding and responding to actions of contemporary regimes – may well be why the theory of totalitarianism first arose and why it may have renewed relevance today. It was, after all, the rise of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union – not to mention the later emergence of the Peoples Republic of China – that marked for many the notion totalitarianism was a new form of government. And it was their attempt at explaining what differentiates totalitarian states from traditional authoritarian ones that may resonate today.
First and foremost among the theories is the theory developed by Fredrich and Brzezinski in the 1950s, which defined totalitarian states through the presence of certain factors: an elaborate guiding ideology (Nazi Germany, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China qualify); a single mass party, typically led by a dictator (again, Nazi Germany, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China qualify); a system of terror, using instruments like violence and a secret police (Nazi Germany, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China qualify); an elaborate guiding ideology (again, Nazi Germany, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China qualify); a monopoly on weapons (Nazi Germany, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China qualify); a monopoly on the means of communication (again, Nazi Germany, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China qualify); and central control of the economy through state planning (Nazi Germany, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China qualify).11
This structural framework worked equally as well as a means for politicians and administrators to identify and respond to the emergence of states who not only engaged in such practices at home but extended those practices to other territories through conquest and/or by engaging spheres of influence – which, in-and-of-itself would become a distinguishing element. Placing these types of regimes in such a framework, politicians and administrators were able to view the regime as a political state, stable in organization and legitimate in construction, through which the
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