North Dakota Supreme Court Highlights
By Michael J. Morley
Author’s Note and Caveat: The following cases of interest were recently
decided by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Because the following
contain the author’s summary of the decisions, the reader is encouraged to
read the entire published decision to determine its precedential value, if
any, in a given case.
Shadow Industries, LLP v. Hoffman, et. al.,
2020 ND 83. Filed 5-7-20.
In this eviction action concerning a farm lease, the Supreme Court
disagreed with the trial court that the lease was ambiguous because
the lease termination was premised upon “when crop years end and
begin.” Because those terms were undefined in the lease, the trial
court determined the lease was ambiguous because it failed to define
the end of the lease. The Supreme Court disagreed. According to
the terms of the lease, it terminated at the end of the 2018 crop year.
The Supreme Court stated while determining when the end of the
2018 crop year occurred may be a question of fact, the term is not
ambiguous simply because it requires a future event or contingency
to determine when the lease ends. The Supreme Court reversed the
district court judgment dismissing the plaintiff ’s eviction action.
Feltman, et. al. v. Gaustad, et. al.,
2020 ND 89. Filed 5-7-20.
In this legal malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the lawyer and his law firm.
The defendant lawyer represented the plaintiff client in banking
litigation. The case was settled and the lawyer, on behalf of the
client, executed a stipulation to dismiss the client’s action against
the bank. Based upon the dismissal stipulation, the district court
ordered the action dismissed. The client sued the lawyer, alleging
malpractice, because the lawyer stipulated that the client’s action
against the bank be dismissed before the bank satisfied certain
terms and conditions of the agreed-upon settlement. The client sued
the lawyer for prematurely agreeing to dismiss against the bank
before the bank satisfied and completed the settlement. The client
sued against the bank before the bank satisfied and completed the
settlement. In affirming the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of the lawyer, the Supreme Court concluded the client did not
establish a required element of a legal malpractice claim. That is,
he was damaged by the lawyer’s breach of duty because, even if the
bank failed to satisfy certain terms and conditions of the settlement
before the lawsuit against the bank was dismissed, that failure did
not prohibit the client from bringing an action against the bank to
enforce the settlement agreement, even after the case was dismissed.
Moreover, the Supreme Court noted the client did not claim that an
action to enforce the settlement agreement with the bank would be
more costly than his original cost of pursuing remedies against them,
or enforcing the settlement agreement left him with an inferior
remedy against the bank than he had in his (now dismissed) lawsuit.
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the client could not show
that the lawyer’s alleged breach of duty proximately caused him any
damages and, therefore, summary judgment in favor of the lawyer, in
the district court, was affirmed.
Dellinger v. Wolf, et. al.,
2020 ND 112. Filed 6-2-20.
This case involved a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether an insurer (Kinsale) had a duty to defend a party in a
personal injury lawsuit. The party, QEP, moved for partial summary
judgment requesting a declaration that Kinsale had a duty to defend
them as an additional insured in the Kinsale policy. The district
court granted partial summary judgment, declaring Kinsale had a
duty to defend QEP.
The district court refused to grant a certification to Kinsale under
N.D.R.Civ.P. Rule 54(b). Notwithstanding that, Kinsale filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court regarding the district court
decision that it was required to defend QEP.
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted the district court’s denial
of certification under Rule 54(b) expressly stated its intent to
reconsider the duty to defend issues after the necessary factual
record was developed at trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
concluded the partial summary judgment regarding Kinsale’s duty
to defend was not immediately appealable under the declaratory
judgment act because that partial judgment was not intended to be
final and was, therefore, not appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
State v. Powley, 2020 ND 124. Filed 6-2-20.
In this sexual offense criminal case, the Supreme Court held that
a warrantless search of a parolee’s cell phone was reasonable where
Michael J. Morley received his juris doctor with distinction and was admitted to the Order of the Coif upon
graduation from the University of North Dakota School of Law in 1979. That same year, he was admitted to practice
law in North Dakota State Courts and the United States District Courts for the District of North Dakota. In 1981, he
was admitted in the Minnesota State Courts and the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, as
well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. He is a member of the State Bar Associations of
North Dakota and Minnesota and is currently president and shareholder of Morley Law Firm, Ltd., in Grand Forks.
20 THE GAVEL