Space Education and Strategic Applications Journal
tion . Other sectors each cover portions of potential Space sector vulnerabilities through defending cyberspace networks , physical locations , and logistics transport yet fail to offer sufficient protection to space infrastructure . When first created , the Department of Homeland Security identified selected areas correlated from previous administrations as central to U . S . protection . All military defense requirements for acquisition , manufacturing and services were categorized as part of the Defense Industrial Base . This assumed all commercial-produced items necessary for military success were built in individual facilities or distinguishable within other facilities . As the Space Force begins operations , the time appears right to propose a space sector , from commercial build and ground control to on-orbit employment , should be considered a critical infrastructure area for the United States .
The next step to evaluating space as a separate sector considers two facets , what functions would be considered space infrastructure , and what risks do those facilities face ? The first space function for considerations should the launch facilities , ground control , and satellites . Without launch , there is no space but without control , any derived value may be greatly reduced . en different , U . S . located , spaceports are currently licensed by the FAA ( FAA , 2018 ). Although the list begins in 1998 , the newest construction was Spaceport America in New Mexico ( America , 2020 ). Any list must also include the manufacture and transportation of space goods and services . Finally , any space infrastructure includes the communication networks required to communicate between ground and on-orbit devices . The equation ’ s other half considers potential risks as the threats and vulnerabilities faced by space CI . Threats to ground-based infrastructure likely remain the same as for other sectors while space will also inherit threats in the manufacture and communication sectors . Unique to space are features like space weather , orbital debris , direct action by adversaries , limited orbital slots , commercial interference as well as potentially unknown events . This area also considers whether the existing Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center ( ISAC ) provides sufficient protection to space facilities
Finally , the paper finishes through evaluating each hypothesis , discussing evidence , and making a recommendation for space as future critical infrastructure . Each hypothesis was be qualitatively evaluated as an aggregate and individual sectors before comparing to the same results for space . These comparisons provide research integrity through demonstrating where each sector might stand during any future process . Additionally , the counter hypothesis offers a contrary opinion to see if other sectors may indeed provide sufficient coverage for space . While eventual decisions will lie at the federal level , comprehensive analysis should add substance any discussions . This last section makes some recommendations for further studies , protection theory , and potentially merging existing CI sectors to create additional budget room for space facilities .
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