Evaluating Space as the Next Critical Infrastructure Sector
1 . Introduction
The most terrible threat for any strategic planner is suffering a Pearl Harbor type event exceeding all previous expectations due to a lack of proper preparation . In all critical infrastructure ( CI ) debate , cyber vulnerabilities have reigned supreme as a panacea to protect the homeland . However , many systems vulnerable to cyberattacks have other inherent weaknesses demanding unique protections best addressed by dedicated bodies of experts . The central question then becomes whether analysts and strategic planners planning for homeland defense identified all correct critical infrastructure areas . Today , the answer should be no . Space infrastructure demonstrates critical contributions to U . S . public safety , provides clear economic benefit , and national security value but remains unaddressed by the Department of Homeland Security as a holistic sector . To understand why space critical infrastructure should be included , one starts with how DHS selects critical infrastructure , which existing areas are protected , identifying critical space capabilities , and validating U . S . benefits . As the Space Force ’ s creation validates , if the U . S . fails defend space infrastructure , we will lose many benefits our citizens value today .
CI ownership has long been solely the executive branch ’ s responsibility with informed opinions occasionally used to review and revise processes , usually when administrations change . Despite adding the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) as a cabinet member , CI history and selection process are largely administratively driven by administrative decisions . The DHS defines critical infrastructure as “ systems and assets , whether physical or virtual , so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security , national economic security , national public health or safety , or any combination of these matters ”( DHS , 2020 ). Sixteen sectors currently constitute the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources ( CIKR ) identified by the DHS and seconded to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ( CISA ). Rather than individually assessing each sector in detail , the employed method measured the sectors as groups against a potential space category . The five combined sectors are hazardous materials , life sustaining support , manufacturing , digital spaces and governance . Each sector was previously assessed as having sufficient impact to require protection with budget , dedicated groups , and processes to accomplish those goals . The five groups were compared to space with three hypotheses , first , comparing public health and economic benefits , second , comparing national security benefits , and finally , evaluating a counter-hypotheses that space facilities are sufficiently protected by other sectors as to not require unique protections .
This paper demonstrates space shows enough common characteristics in national security , economic benefit , public health , and public safety with other critical infrastructure areas to merit consideration as a separate func-
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