SotA Anthology 2020-21 | Page 162

Stephen Harwood
would protect those tyrannical powers from accountability ( Tesón , 2003 : 129 ). Nonintervening powers would effectively , in Tesón ’ s words , “ use the victims of tyranny and anarchy ” ( 2003 : 112 ) in order to preserve the status quo . One unavoidable problem of intervention , however , is its potentially overwhelming cost . These costs are not only to the economies of intervening countries , but also soldiers sent to deal with potentially traumatic situations ( Dobos and Coady , 2014 : 81-87 ). Any intervening state would have to carefully consider the potential domestic challenges it may give rise to . Concerns over stability are useful insofar as they would temper ill-judged humanitarian interventions from causing more problems than they solve . However , these are not arguments against intervention . They are arguments for proper conduct in intervention . how armed humanitarian intervention is moral . There is general agreement that it should be no more than a “ discretionary ” imperfect duty : one which we are not required to fulfill at all times but only in particular circumstances ( Holzgrefe , 2003 : 26 ). Even the liberal pro-interventionist Tesón argues that states only have an obligation to intervene in cases of humanitarian crisis “ if we can do so at a reasonable cost to ourselves ” ( 2003 : 94 ). The basis of a moral obligation is strong , though . Scheid notes that if , as an international community , we are committed to universal human rights , the community then has a “ duty to see to it that these rights … are always both respected and enforced ” ( 2014 : 9 ). The only caveats to this duty concern matters of proportionality and likelihood of success .
Human Rights
The moral basis for intervention
Having rejected any basis for an absolute rule of nonintervention , it must now be considered when and
As noted above , Walzer makes exceptions to his non-intervention rule in extreme humanitarian ( and national liberation ) crises . He acknowledges that a state ’ s legal rights have “ no force
162