was justified by European powers on the notion of a ‘ civilising ’ mission . This is certainly not a desirable environment to return to .
Walzer gives a small number of exceptions to his nonintervention rule , which suggest that sovereignty can never be an absolute guard against intervention . These exceptions are : national liberation struggles , counter-intervention , enslavement or massacre ( Walzer , 2015:90 ). When a government is engaged in violence against its own citizens in such a way to create an extreme crisis , a moral duty to aid is surely greater than a moral duty not to intervene . Sovereignty is perhaps best viewed as an instrumental value . When it is used and abused to cause suffering among those it is designed to protect , it no longer has any moral force ( Tesón , 2003 : 93 ).
Stability and peace
While conceding that sovereignty is conditional , one might still conclude that a rule of non-intervention is necessary to preserve stability and peace .
Phil302
There is no doubt that armed humanitarian intervention “ inevitability brings … coercion and ravages ” ( Walzer , 2015 : 86 ). The question is whether these ravages are less morally undesirable than the prevention of a humanitarian crisis is desirable . Intervention is almost never a straightforward affair , and when executed poorly can destabilise a region , causing greater suffering in the long term ( Walzer , 2015 : 88 ). Kutz identifies the supposedly ‘ humanitarian ’ intervention in Libya against Gaddafi as one which destabilised the region and brought external problems into the state ( 2014 : 244 ). He also asserts that “ even limited humanitarian interventions can give rise to enduring commitments ” ( Kutz , 2014 : 246 ).
As above , non-interventionist concerns are salient , but they are not strong enough to warrant a rule against any humanitarian intervention . Stability , on its own , is not a moral defence of allowing human rights abuses ( Caney , 2005 : 240 ). Often the greatest sources of ‘ stability ’ are tyrannical powers . Walzer ’ s rule
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