PHIL276 Language in Society
constituted by , an entity which has a property independently of constitution relations , then that something possesses the property derivatively ( Ott , 2009 : 48 ). In this scenario , identity is split into ‘ persons ’ and ‘ organisms ’, and since the organism constitutes the person , they are bound by a constitutional relation . In the case of advanced directives , these directives represent ‘ the person ’ s free and autonomous choices …. vis a vis the constitutional relation , those directives represented the organisms free and autonomous choices as well ’ ( Ott , 2009 : 50 ), which gives one grounds to respect an advanced directive in some scenarios as the previous ‘ person ’ on Ott ’ s ( and Baker ’ s ) account is the most ethical choice of advocate for an organism that holds no autonomy ( Ibid ). There is no denying that there is a constitutional relation between organism and person ; the organism , and its brain structure instantiates consciousness and the psychological continuity that is needed for personhood . However , if I have understood correctly , Ott perceives this relation as a symbiotic one - where it does not matter if one is constituted or constitutes , so long as a relation was established at some point then we ought to respect the organism ’ s decisions . Again , this is philosophically neat , and does play into the cartesian
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intuition of a body / mind divide ( or organism / person , in Ott ’ s terminology ). The problem I find is that we have forgotten about contingency . Body can constitute mental properties , but psychological properties cannot constitute a physical organism . To create a person , it is of course the case that the organism must be prior in conception . It could be argued that this weakens my argument against the non-animalism of the self , but I wish to clarify my current claim . The psychological states that make a ‘ person ’ are constituted by but irreducible to its physical ‘ base ’. Mental states are something over and above the processes of a physical organism , and it is these mental states that make ‘ I ’. If the instantiation of the mental in this case is contingent on the arrangement of the brain , then how does such a relation work both ways , how can it be genuinely symbiotic ? Surely , when the organism undergoes significant changes , so does the person ? We can apply our earlier argumentation at this level . Dementia weakens and radically alters the structure of the brain ; the structure of the brain is a part of the physical organism ; the physical organism constitutes the psychological conditions for personhood ; so if the organism ’ s brain is altered then we not only have a different organism , we have a different person too . Ott ’ s