are also of importance . It also proves that advanced directives , in most cases , are insufficient with directing instructions for every course of action that may happen in the future- they do not stipulate what to do in all future scenarios and leave room for interpretation . Where there is the capacity for interpretation , the advanced directive again loses its force as ultimately it is up to another rational agent to interpret that and follow through with a course of action . t2 Margo ’ s present contextual factors and her values ( which I will discuss later ) are more important than any advanced directive which must be discounted .
McMahan speaks of different persons in terms of weak ‘ prudential unity relations ’ which consist in the structural capacity for consciousness ( Ott , 2009 : 48 ). The unity relations , he argues , that bind the person are severely weakened through dementia ( since the structure of the brain becomes fragmented ), so what is best for Margo is to continue to live happily . McMahan remarks that ‘ I believe we should conclude that what is best for the Demented Patient now is determined primarily by her present nature and preferences rather than by what would make her life as a whole better ’ ( McMahan , 2002 : 501 ). I appreciate the effort that McMahan goes to in attempting to ‘ weakly ’ unify the
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pre-demented and demented selves on some psychological instead of animalistic basis . Whilst I agree that the advanced directive loses its force because there is an insufficient relation between pre and post dementia Margo , I think that any psychological unity at all falls short . McMahan admits that ‘ life does , after all , constitute a significant whole , though the Demented Patient now is , as it were , dangling outside the unified part of that whole , and the longer she continues to exist , the more the integrity of the whole is compromised or degraded ’ ( McMahan , 2002 : 502 ). In virtue of existing outside of the ‘ whole ’, it seems to me that any attempt to unify two selves will fail in virtue of them being two different selves .
As in the Margo example , it is initially counterintuitive to suggest that there have been two Margo ’ s in the ‘ same shell ’, the same physical organism . McMahan attempts to relate the organism to the body through weak prudential unity relations , but I believe it is insufficient . This may seem problematic ; we are referring to the same organism , with the same name , Margo , but we are to believe that the Margo at t1 is not the Margo at t2 . Ott , developing from Baker ’ s ideas , speaks of ‘ constitutional relations ’ in which if something constitutes , or is