of socialisation and not necessarily reason) it is not immutable and is
supplemented by the agent’s reflection and reason. In this way, RMS
provides the original moral experience required by reflective judgment’s
operation in appraising a moral situation, but, RMS in itself does not
contradict or cause problems for ethical principles. It is simply a starting
point, a resource for the reflective judgment to draw upon initially and
itself is subject to the reflective judgment, which subjects it to the cognitive
power of the agent for evaluation (Kant, 1987, p.400). In this way, it is not
so much that it picks out morally salient features for the judgment, and thus
determines what the agent perceives, rather, the judgment utilises and
examines RMS and determines what the RMS picks out in a reciprocating
relationship (O’Neill, 1989, p.4). The agent initially perceives what they
are socialised to, then, the power of the reflective judgment shapes that
perception, before determination of what concept a situation should be
placed under. I do not believe that this formulation poses any difficulties
or problems for principle-based ethical theories and shows the power
of judgment being able to deal with the ongoing perception of morally
salient features and its role in the genesis of the moral experience used
in its operation. This also, I believe, demonstrates where the perceived
goodness of moral perception comes from: the accurate recognition of
morally salient features is praised due its reflection of the accuracy of
the agent’s power of judgment in its reflective capacity of appraisal. This
provides a coherent and reconcilable response to the problem of moral
perception’s intrinsic moral goodness.
The last point I will address is that of moral action that is generated
from moral perception prior to ethical principles being invoked. There
are several solutions to this problem which can resolve it without
causing a contradiction or limit to moral principles. Previously mentioned
points also pertain here. That the strategies of judgment operate quite
unconsciously is worth examining in this context. Take the example
mentioned above whereby moral action is taken via compassion. If
the ability to recognise distress is a necessary component of enacting
the Kantian maxim of beneficence and helping other people, then the
Kantian agent would have failed if they do not act when recognising
distress (Herman, 1985, p.423). The reflective power of judgment, in
picking out the morally salient features, through the methods described
above, recognises the child’s discomfort as morally significant. It is not
necessary for the agent to consciously apply the determinative judgment
when, in situations as morally clear as in the example, the reflective
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