previous experience. Further, general maxims of judgment are also
brought into operation quite unconsciously. When a scientist approaches
an experiment, they don’t need to repeat and memorise certain mantras
(as in, the logical ways in which experiments should be conducted. For
example, ‘a positive claim requires evidence’. It is simply taken as a
given without conscious thought being needed unless it is addressed
specifically) to themselves to ensure they are approaching it correctly.
These maxims are engrained ways of processing information and ways
of thinking that guide appraisals. They may be learnt or modified but
their actual operation does not require conscious thought. It is plausible,
therefore, that the reflective judgment is capable of identifying morally
salient features in ways that fit with our natural experience of moral
situations. Once the reflective judgment has appraised the situation of
its moral character, the other sphere of judgment, determinant judgment,
is then able to invoke the ethical principle (Kant, 1987, p.400). This
adequately deals with the objections that an agent may not see morally
salient features or recognise them as morally salient in themselves, as
reflective judgment has the tools available to it to do these very actions.
However, it could be said that such an explanation, while feasible, still
doesn’t deal with an important question: that of the origin of the moral
experience necessary for the judgment to draw upon. Proponents of
moral perception very well might say that while the above is all well and
good, the genesis of moral experience, prior to the agent even arriving
at ethical principles, is still moral perception. In order to develop a moral
system and utilise moral judgment, one requires moral perception in the
first place.
I intend to offer a formulation of Kantianism that accounts for this
foundational moral knowledge. Prior to having moral experience, the
agent can draw upon ‘rules of moral salience’ (Herman, 1985, p.418)
(from here on, RMS). RMS are part of moral education that allow the
agent to pick out features that require moral attention. RMS is informed
and shaped by upbringing, reflection and societal values. They determine
what the agent initially views as morally significant and provide a practical
framework of reference for the agent. Within this framework, the agent
can then use the power of reflective and determinant judgment to decide
on moral action. RMS can be modified through reflection and education,
as the agent matures and develops ethically (Herman, 1985, p. 419). In
this formulation, RMS provides the initial bedrock upon which reflective
judgment rests, but, due to its arbitrary nature (insofar as it is a product
104