and individuals identified as “terrorists” can be considered as spoilers. The issue of
spoilers is complicated, but the UN has experience in this regard and the concept is
not as prejudicial as that of terrorist.
MINUSMA’s capacities for preventing or mitigating the effects of terrorist acts must
be reinforced but must not participate in a war against terrorism. In the latter case, if
the French and African forces continue this war, an exit strategy for MINUSMA must
be considered.
Event Description.
This lesson is based on information from the following sources:
(1) What Does ‘Stabilisation’ Mean in a UN Peacekeeping Context? by Cedric de
Coning, 19 January 2015.
(2) The Dilemmas of International Intervention in Mali, by Bruno Charbonneau, Chaire
Raoul-Dandurand, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) [University of Quebec
at Montreal], October 2017.
(3) French Army Update – April 2018, by Lt-Col Thomas Pieau, 1 April 2018.
(4) Enhancing the Primacy of Civil Authority in the Security Sector in Mali and Africa, by
the Mali Watch Group (a non-partisan coalition concerned about restoring peace,
security, and democracy to the people of Mali), www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org /
http://www.thebridgesinstitute.org, 22 October 2013.
(5) Robustness, Cooperation with Local Forces and the UN Human Rights Due Diligence
Policy (HRDDP), by Tobias von Gienanth, Zentrum für Internationale Friedens-
einsätze (ZIF) [Center for International Peace Operations], 17 April 2014.
(6) Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, Report of the UN Secretary-General,
8 May 2018.
D. Key Elements for Effective Strategic Communication in Peace
Operations (AMISOM Experience) (Lesson #2623)
Observation:
The United Nations endeavored to meet strategic communications requirements in Somalia
through utilization of a consortium of private firms known as the AU-UN Information Support
Team (IST), which planned and conducted strategic communications in support of AMISOM
and against al-Shabaab. Although the IST played an innovative and important function for
AMISOM, it suffered from multiple significant challenges beginning in late 2012 – which
greatly reduced its effectiveness over the next several years.
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