Essentially, the French Operation Barkhane operation manages the use of force (against
“terrorists”) in order to create space for MINUSMA (and international partners) to work
toward conflict resolution. That being said, as evidenced in a great deal of peace and
conflict literature, “conflict management” is often an obstacle to “conflict resolution” – as use
of force can often counter non-lethal instruments/ influences on actors to peacefully resolve
their grievances/conflicts. This “competing” approach can create an unending continuum of
“non-stabilization” – as witnessed in Mali and numerous other environments (Afghanistan,
Somalia, etc.). “It is not surprising that French generals claim that they will be in Mali and
the Sahel for the next 15 to 20 years.” (2)
In truth, MINUSMA has not achieved the desired impact of “stabilization” for Mali. Operation
Barkhane is well aimed, but its separation from MINUSMA is possible and perhaps needed.
As for MINUSMA, rather than peacekeeping “robustness” that can be perceived as working
to contain terrorists and perpetrators of violence, it seems more prudent to have peace-
keeping “robustness” designed, resourced, and focused on providing an impartial presence
that helps the host nation move toward reconciliation, conflict resolution, stable governance,
and security services seen as legitimate and supportive of society.
“Establishing a strong, sustainable civil-military relationship that
institutionalizes the primacy of civil authority and takes a more strategic,
peacebuilding approach to security sector development will be the key
component of national reconciliation and addressing the main drivers of
conflict, as will be the professionalization and capacity-building of Malian
security forces. … This includes the military leadership level and the
gendarmerie and police as well as regular military forces in ensuring the
security of the civilian population and communities rather than the security
of state instrumentalities, as well as inclusion of reconcilable armed groups.
Inculcating a public service ethic among these personnel as integral
to their professional ethic will, over time, help temper their behavior
towards civilians and thus improve the civil-military relationship.” (4)
Recommendations.
1. MINUSMA’s “robust” posture should be directed towards the objective of a stabilizing
presence – one that actively helps the host nation move toward reconciliation, conflict
resolution, and governmental delivery of services for the safety and security of Mali’s
people. For the latter, inculcating a public service ethic among the host nation’s security
personnel is of utmost importance.
2. The author of the article “The Dilemmas of International Intervention in Mali” specifically
recommends:
MI NUSMA must be disassociated from Operation Barkhane, or the French forces
must be integrated into the UN command. The integration of the French forces into
the UN command, although unlikely at this point, would serve to limit war operations.
MINUSMA and its partners must stop emphasizing the war against terrorism in order
to focus on the fundamental political questions at the core of the conflict. The groups
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