Army has committed to an overly broad mission equally balancing offensive,
defensive and stability operations. However, of the three broad mission areas,
stability operations are the most complex as they require other than military
solutions and integration of interagency, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and multinational forces to achieve unity of purpose during interventions. As resources “dry up,” many of the critical organizations required to
cooperate in stability (and peacekeeping) operations, to include Department of
Defense (DoD), Department of State, USAID, Department of Justice, Department
of Agriculture, etc., lack the funds and personnel to routinely train below the
combatant commander headquarters level on stability operations. In addition,
access to NGOs during tactical and operational level training exercises is limited
to non-existent. Finally, the Army’s Regional Alignment of Forces effort is
designed to maintain limited military-to-military cultural and training familiarity, but
has almost exclusively focused on offensive and defensive operations. As the
Army continues to down size and substantial numbers of veterans depart, the
Army will be forced to learn the complexity of closely integrating and supporting
diplomatic, development, and political mechanisms to achieve a long term
solution during military interventions. Though the U.S. and DoD have adopted a
strategy avoiding long term stability operations, even small scale military interventions (such as Kosovo in 1999, Mali in 2013, and Sudan in 2014) required
both operational and tactical level units that understand how security efforts
support and fit into the broader considerations of successful peacekeeping and
stability operations.
The real lessons, which tactical level units do not routinely train during Combat
Training Center (CTC) rotations, focus on how leaders understand that stability
operations must be purposed-based – directed toward transforming conflict to
prevent resurgence of violence while building legitimate governance. Framing
considerations of stability operations is not only resident at the strategy level, but
also at the operational and tactical levels. Framing ensures we have good goals
and employs a framework to gain common purpose from different actors
involved. Tactical level units must see incorporation of different actors providing
different solutions as critical enablers to success and not as obstacles impeding
security concerns alone. Broadening tactical level training and considerations to
include interagency, NGOs, and multinational participation complicates training
but better approaches the reality of what U.S. forces can expect to face in the
near future.
Existing Army education and training at the lieutenant, captain and major levels
lack incorporation of necessary details to completely appreciate stability considerations. The officer’s basic course, officer’s advanced courses, and NCO
courses do not incorporate stability doctrine into their programs of instruction.
Even the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) treats stability operations
as an elective (as does the Army War College), vice critical to the core curriculum. Consequently, unless officers benefit from truly broadening assignments
(outside of traditional Army), the reality that stability operations are never fast,
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