SOLLIMS Sampler Volume 7, Issue 2 | Page 10

armed resistance to the UN military troops. Those groups consisted of (1) supporters of the former president and (2) urban gangs. In fact, the initial Brazilian Brigade Haiti that deployed in 2004 found itself frequently (sometimes daily/nightly) confronting the urban/armed gangs. Information received from the Brazilian Brigade Haiti (and its battalions) included reports on complex urban operations, robust and intense patrolling, cordon and search operations, and various other operations and tasks – information that was essential for informing the training/instructors at the newly created training center, CIOpPaz. Based upon this information, specific courses were created especially for junior leaders (such as lieutenants and sergeants), but also for company commanders, battalion commanders, and staff officers. In these courses of instruction, the conditions/scenarios for Haiti were explicitly spelled out, and the personnel undergoing the training were taught to fully understand the mandate’s tasks, identify risks, and make and implement appropriate decisions. In the 2005-2007 timeframe, focus areas for training included Rules of Engagement, marksmanship, urban combat, leadership, and engagements with civilian actors – to include engagements involving initial contact, liaison, public information, and conflict resolution. Additionally, lessons learned from the field were incorporated back into the training and doctrine (tasks, techniques, and procedures) – especially in the areas of strategic communication, operations, intelligence, logistics, civil-military coordination, and legal actions. In 2008, when “policing” tasks became prevalent for MINSUSTAH, the training center (CIOpPaz) adjusted its curriculum to cover temporary detention of individuals, prison mandates/tasks, overt policing, riot control, and other policing/security tasks. Then, after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the training center quickly incorporated tasks, techniques, and procedures for burials, protection of displaced persons, provision and execution of security at food/water distribution sites, and various civil-military coordination activities. Later in 2010, CIOpPaz was transformed and renamed the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). Due to the growing volume of tasks/actions foreseen for the first Brazilian contingent to deploy to Haiti post-earthquake, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense decided to establish a Joint Training Center to coordinate the preparation/training of the various personnel (Army, Navy, Air Force, police, and civilian) slated for deployment with MINUSTAH. CCOPAB’s system of peacekeeping training evolved over the next several years into a system whereby battalion commanders, their staffs, company commanders, and platoon-level leaders (Army, Navy, and Air Force) received generic training related to the UN and specific training related to MINUSTAH at CCOPAB, and they then returned to their organizations to train their subordinates. The training methodology at CCOPAB includes workgroups, command post exercises, and leadership exercises. CCOPAB also provides a series of specialized courses for battalion staff personnel on certain key functions to be performed in Haiti, such as logistics & reimbursement, civil-military coordination, and working with translators and interpreters. In the final phase of Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 9 of 45