managed, and equal or higher to that of their peers. Additionally, it was important
for leaves to be carefully managed – predictable and supported.
Present for duty strength of partner forces. CSM guidelines called for partner
platoons that consisted of a minimum of 20 personnel who would run 24-hour
operations and execute combined patrols at each checkpoint. Although the
numbers started out strong at the checkpoints, after 30 days, partner units’
strength diminished to roughly squad-size, while the U.S. maintained full-strength
platoons.
Talent and training for partner manning of the Combined Coordination Centers.
Initially, the partners provided adequate manning, but this quickly tapered off
through high personnel turnover, particularly among the Iraqis. Every day was
“discovery learning” for some of the new personnel, as opposed to routine
operations – which was not a good situation for the CCC regarding handling
information, sharing information, and responding to crises.
“Direct line to Baghdad” and “Direct line to Erbil” from the Combined Coordination
Center. It was important for U.S. leadership in the CCC to be aware that person-
nel manning the CCC might have external communications unrelated to the CSM.
Partner communications from the Combined Coordination Centers to the check-
points. Based on reliability of functioning of those communications, communica-
tions from U.S. to U.S. liaison may be needed/better option.
“Local” forces manning the checkpoints. In western Diyala Province, local Iraqi
Army and local Kurds manned the checkpoints. Some of these individuals had
previously been manning standoff checkpoints in same areas and had bones to
pick with each other. Although U.S. forces managed this situation, it could have
been avoided early on by bringing in Iraqi and Kurdish forces from another
location, vice “local” personnel.
Interpreters. The CSM had high interpreter/translator requirements. Often had to
shuffle these personnel and reprioritize their work to have coverage in the right
places.
As far as an overall assessment of the CSM, in most locations along the fault lines, the
“Golden Lions” were viewed by the local populace as the most trusted force. Most people
believed that they would get a fair shake from the “Golden Lions” at checkpoints and
whenever/wherever they were seen out on patrol. Additionally, the “Golden Lions” proved
to be a tremendous asset during the Iraqi national elections of 2010 for confidence-building
and area security around polling sites, particularly in Mosul and Kirkuk.
Recommendations:
1. When U.S. forces are conducting a Stability mission, and the Area of Operations includes
territory in which two (or more) local groups/factions have disputed boundaries, then the
U.S. should consider establishment of a security framework/mechanism like the CSM.
2. If establishing a CSM-like framework/mechanism, then ensure that the recognized leaders
of the local groups/factions establish a set of rules for the forces involved.
3. If establishing a CSM-like framework/mechanism, pay heed to the key issues / potential
pitfalls identified in this lesson.
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