everything “together” with trainers making it clear that a force would face danger
and death “together” as one unit; and the cadre tried to build trust across the
three parties during physical training and individual MEDEVAC drills (e.g.,
American and Kurd pulling an Iraqi on a litter).
Graduation was showcased as a significant event/accomplishment – including
unit demonstrations of drilled capabilities [e.g., dismounted movement and react
to contact, clear a room in a mixed stack, call for and adjust fire/Close Air Support
(CAS), apply buddy aid, etc.]. Graduation was attended by significant personali-
ties. Distinctive unit insignia was awarded to graduates.
Deployment:
After graduation, the combined units were posted to their checkpoints. Each
checkpoint was manned by a combined company consisting of one platoon of
U.S. Soldiers, one platoon of Iraqi Army, and one platoon of Kurdish Peshmerga
(or in the case of inner city Kirkuk, a platoon of Kirkuk Police Force – Kurdish).
Operations at checkpoints were U.S.-led, but included consensus and peers/
partner lieutenants involved in executing operations.
U.S. MRAPs (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles) were allocated to the
checkpoints. Initially, the checkpoints had a mix (U.S. MRAPS, Iraqi HMMWVs,
and no vehicles with the Kurds), but then U.S. leaders decided that it was
inappropriate for only the U.S. personnel to be traveling in the safest vehicle.
Additional MRAPS were allocated to the checkpoints, and all personnel then
travelled in the safest vehicle. U.S. Soldiers drove, manned crew served
weapons, and TC’d (track commanded, i.e., were in charge of) the vehicles.
Key Issues (potential pitfalls, if not properly addressed):
The Combined Security Mechanism only worked with U.S. force presence. For
example, during the drawdown, U.S. platoons were removed from certain check-
points and “area coverage” was provided by frequent patrols of U.S. forces from
other checkpoints nearby; however, the performance by the remaining force of
just Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga severely deteriorated.
The CSM must be manned by combined forces who pass through a crucible of
training together; they must know each other and trust each other.
MEDEVAC and fire support response time. All checkpoints were within a 30-40
minute ring for MEDEVAC, but this was not the case for fire support. Fire support
was a cause for concern for U.S. leadership. Most checkpoints could be covered
by Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), but response time varied.
At some of the more distant rural checkpoints, mortar tubes were then allocated.
Equipping status of partner forces. Kurdish Peshmerga troops were poorly
equipped (uniforms, cold weather and rain gear, weapons, individual protective
equipment, etc.), while most Iraqi personnel were well equipped in American
gear. This problem should be addressed/fixed at the outset, during combined
training.
Personnel issues – pay and leaves. This is huge. It was important for Iraqi
and Kurdish Peshmerga personnel to receive pay that was consistent, carefully
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