and appoint military leadership as desired; and, the President's ability to shield
from view military spending and procurement processes. Much of this
Presidential power and military autonomy was the legacy of President Pinochet
(1973-1989 timeframe). In the early 1990s, the military was authorized 4 of 9
seats in the Senate, 2 of 7 seats in the Constitutional Tribunal, and a majority of
seats in the National Security Council. However, all of these authorizations/
privileges have been removed over time.
In the 1990s, Chilean civilian and military officials engaged in a slow, deliberate
process of legislative and bureaucratic reforms to change the powers of the
President and the autonomy given to the military. Military prerogatives became
slowly watered down over time to reflect civilian interests and inputs. Chilean
civilian and military personnel likewise made a conscious decision in the 1990s to
subject their positions/actions on security and defense to the scrutiny of the other
side – publicly articulating concerns, issues, and plans to discover where shared
understandings could be found and common ground built. Through these
debates and dialogue, a common lexicon was essentially established between
both sides. Also, because of this dialogue and understanding, a productive set of
Defense Policy iterations took shape, culminating in the formal Defense Strategy
of 2012 that was developed with consultation and cooperation between agencies.
Today, security dialogues in Chile reflect the plural interests of all sides of the
security and political sectors.
In the 1990s, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was actually considered a marginal
organization within the government, and it was accordingly sidestepped by senior
military leaders in their decision-making. However, the careful stewardship of
then Minister of Defense Michele Bachelet (2002-2004) paved the way for
significant reforms to take place in the MOD, to include the creation of a Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the development of Joint doctrine. The Minister of Defense
came to be seen then as the central person to initiate major reforms, to bring the
other civilian and ministry sides into the process, and to serve as a buffer, or
bridge, between involved or competing government organizations. Most
importantly, the MOD cultivated a role in relation to the military as its "facilitator"
in solving interagency challenges, its "representative" to address military
problems, its "translator" of defense issues of detailed specificity that could
operationalize policy objectives, its "broker" between the government agencies,
and its "shield" to help address/blunt criticisms of the military.
Recommendation.
Those involved in the long-term process of security sector development should
consider the noteworthy steps taken by Chilean officials to:
1. Correct any imbalances at the national level involving excessive military
authority or autonomy.
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