Australia , for its part , should avoid temptation to match , or exceed , China ’ s commitments . Instead , building genuine partnerships that address different needs of Pacific island countries is Australia ’ s best chance to achieve interconnected objectives . And in this , enhanced Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief , or HADR as it is known , remains an underexplored opportunity .

China ’ s bid under its proposed “ China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision ” and “ Five-Year Action Plan ( 2022 – 26 )” includes doubling the volume of bilateral trade between China and its economic partners , which could potentially circumvent other regional initiatives such as that put forward by the United States , the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity .

China also seeks to widen its engagement with the Pacific region , via the China-Pacific Island Countries Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement Capacity and Police Cooperation . China is demonstrating confidence by moving from bilateralism , for example in policing , to multilateralism .

Prioritizing consensus at the May 30 meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi , the 10 Pacific Islands Foreign Ministers agreed to cooperate in five areas including economic recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic and new centers for agriculture and disaster .

Outside of the meeting , the responses of the various Pacific island representatives reflected their diverse historical and contemporary experiences . Samoa signed a bilateral agreement with China that included funding for major infrastructure

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projects , and Fiji expressed desire to pursue additional bilateral arrangements .

In contrast , the presidents of the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau ( which , along with three other Pacific islands countries , has diplomatic relations with Taiwan ) expressed skepticism and caution about China ’ s proposals .

The limits of China ’ s diplomatic reach may also have been exposed , as Pacific islands countries were likely frustrated that the agreement was drafted without consultation , rather than through “ quiet negotiation and deliberative discussions .” Civil society groups in Samoa , Kiribati and Solomon Islands also expressed concerns around how the proposed agreements impact press freedom , transparency and democracy .

Australia is a major foreign aid and trading partner for Pacific island countries , with a history that may provide diplomatic reach greater than China ’ s . Yet some of China ’ s proposed initiatives – if implemented – would conflict with existing Australian arrangements that also seek to integrate Pacific island countries into economic and security institutions .

Hence , China ’ s proposal has been described as a “ direct challenge ”, which Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese argues demands a response . Foreign Minister Penny Wong ’ s desire to build a stronger Pacific Family has been welcome by Fiji , and Wong has committed to bring “ more resources ” to the region .

Australia should not compete with China ’ s resources in a zero-sum game because it would backfire . Australia and Pacific Islands countries should not share security priorities because the relative weighting will be different .

Pacific island countries emphasize

security threats including climate change or illegal fishing . As Fiji ’ s Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama argued , “ Geopolitical point-scoring means less than little to anyone whose community is slipping beneath the rising seas ”. Pacific island countries have expressed a determination not to be “ dragged ” into a geostrategic competition .

By eyeing the Pacific as a competitive backyard , or by emphasizing the prospect of Chinese financed dual-use infrastructure ports or fishing fleets for grey zone activity , Australia would only undermine how successfully its policies respond to interests of different Pacific Islands countries – and would overlook that Pacific island countries are not “ passive dupes ” and can leverage Australia-China geopolitics to their advantage .

Australia should instead take deliberate steps to understand , and act on the security priorities of Pacific Islands countries in ways that achieve true partnership . Equally , Australia should actively promote Pacific regionalism , cohesion , cooperation , and solidarity .

This can be achieved by enhancing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Camp or HADR .

Australia could support Fiji ’ s Blackrock Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Camp to host simulated regional disaster exercises . With the consensus of Pacific island countries , all relevant humanitarian , military and police actors could participate – trilateral co-operation between Australia , the United States and China is not impossible .

A working group could procure resources that meet the unique requirements of Pacific island countries and develop coordination guidelines , and such dialogue could rebuild cohesion .

Enhanced HADR can accommodate the proposed China-Pacific agreement on disaster management . If the proposal isn ’ t implemented , Australia could empower the first , Pacific-led coordination center for HADR .

In HADR , there is an important opportunity for Australia to demonstrate a new commitment to a Pacific-first strategy . Current Pacific-led initiatives , such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group proposal for a Humanitarian and Emergency Response Coordination Centre , remain unrealized . Opportunities for locally-led disaster response are also sidelined . Australia instead pursues regional HADR initiatives through the South Pacific Defense Ministers Meeting that includes few Pacific island countries as partners .

The Albanese government must avoid making a damaging impression that Australia ’ s HADR initiatives are largely motivated by the concern to mitigate foreign influence – as former prime minister Scott Morrison did with suggestions that Australia ’ s Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy blocked “ incursion into our region .” Instead , the government should demonstrate understanding that Pacific islands countries value many relationships , even more when partners voluntarily cooperate to benefit the region , as in HADR .

In a promising sign , Wong has been quick to recognize that “ our security and prosperity is truly a thing we achieve together , or not at all .” Australia needs to resolve listen to Pacific island countries , respect and support those that do reach agreements with China , offer compelling alternatives for others , while delivering programs that set Australia apart . These steps build trust and solidarity . HADR provides this pathway . With careful diplomacy , Australia and Pacific Islands countries can absolutely gain . ( The Interpreter / Lowy Institute )