Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide, Second Edition Second Edition | Page 43

Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide
continually changing. Relevant formal written guidance may not exist or, if it does, may be
obsolete because of more recent verbal direction or a rapidly-changing situation. Additionally,
different partners will likely be operating under different sets of guidance. For example, coalition
partners will often be responsible to their own national authorities. Senior commanders can be
instrumental in shaping strategic direction through their consultations with their political
leadership. They should have a good working relationship and shared understanding with relevant
political leaders and should consult with them as necessary. PoC will often be included in higher
direction, and leaders will often have a choice between using imperfect guidance as an excuse for
inaction or a license to act as necessary.
T YPE OF C ONFLICT
PoC will likely have to be addressed within the context of a conflict that is already under way
or likely to emerge. Examples include inter-state war, a proxy war, civil war, insurgency,
secessionist or irredentist conflict, terrorism, a failed state situation, or instability in the aftermath
of a natural disaster. The type of conflict will affect the civilian vulnerabilities and threats as well
as the military force’s actions and mission priorities. The type of conflict may change, particularly
as actors adapt and develop new ways to pursue their objectives. It may also be helpful to consider
PoC within the context of different scenarios:
• Mass atrocities.
• Armed conflict.
• Government repression.
• Post-conflict instability.
• Communal conflict.
• Predatory violence.
• Mob violence. 22
S TRATEGIC L OGIC OF P ERPETRATORS
Although they are often portrayed as irrational, perpetrators may deliberately target civilians
as a calculated means to achieve strategic objectives which could be legitimate and understandable.
Motivations could be due to deep-seated ethnic, political, ideological, or economic grievances;
alternatively, such grievances could be manipulated by the perpetrators’ leadership. Violence
against victims could be pursued for its own sake (for example, to destroy an identity group the
perpetrator views as a threat), or it could be a means to an end. An accurate understanding of the
perpetrators’ strategic logic may suggest a range of methods to improve civilian protection. Some
perpetrators may be influenced by a cost-benefit analysis or opportunism, and potentially
dissuaded from undesired actions. Others may be undeterred from conducting violence against
civilian populations because they believe such action is necessary for their own survival or for
other reasons. Different levels of perpetrators (i.e., architects, facilitators, and foot-soldiers) may
operate with different thought processes and, consequently, may be influenced in different ways. 23
22
Adapted from Stian Kjeksrud, Alexander W. Beadle, and Petter H.F. Lindvist, Protecting Civilians from Violence: A
Threat-Based Approach to Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research
Establishment (FFI) and the Norwegian Defence International Center (NODEFIC), 2016. See this and other related FFI
publications for discussions of PoC planning scenarios including their indicators.
23
Max Kelly, Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center,
Spring 2010), 13-14.
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