Since every state chooses to operate their residential facilities differently, some states have stricter juve-
nile justice laws and less diversion programming, and some states offer more treatment programming
within residential facilities, which can oftentimes be more costly.
All of these factors and many more come into play when calculating confinement costs per
state. This becomes immensely more complicated when trying to calculate per diem costs per child,
finding the properly-logged information on what child was placed in which residential facility(ies) for
what crime(s), for what period of time, receiving what specific services, [how many days did said child
receive each service for?]; so when taking all of these into account for each state, it is safe to say some
things get lost in translation. A uniform system, though a difficult transition at first, would benefit
everyone involved.
According to the JPI, the drastic cost variations between states are largely due to treatment
and rehabilitation services, where states that provide a wide variety of intensive services spend more
per youth, as well as, privatization and unions -where states that commit youth to private facilities or
prohibit unionization have the tendency to have lower operating costs (2014). Another source of cost
variation between states is staffing and capacity utilization, where states that use fewer facilities spend
less than states who are operating “many sparsely populated facilities” (JPI, 2014). Each state decides
the level of federal, state, and county dollars allocated toward commitment expenditures. However,
confinement costs are directly covered by taxpayers regardless of what level of government is
allocating funding, costing hundreds of dollars per day and, “getting no real benefit in terms of helping
youth transition to adulthood and promoting public safety” (JPI, 2014).
Another set of costs are those associated with recidivism after confinement, the cost to future
victims [victims directly harmed when the juvenile acts criminally as a result of former confinement]
as well as costs to taxpayers who pay JJS processing fees after a failed first attempt of rehabilitation
through the means of confinement (JPI, 2014). The costs associated with the victim are categorized as
“tangible” – property damage, medical expenses, lost wages because of an injury, etc. and
“intangible” – pain and suffering from the crime, which are hard to quantify (JPI, 2014).
Public Safety and Public Opinion
In 1933, Charles L. Chute (first president of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency)
argued that “community-based efforts were more effective, less costly, and more likely to lead to safer
communities” (Russell, 2017). Russell argues that juvenile justice in the U.S. has focused primarily on
three goals: punitive accountability, positive rehabilitation, and sustainable community safety, shifting
the importance of each goal throughout different periods in JJS history (2017). Russell believes that the
difficulty lies in finding a way to maximize all three goals (2017). Russell further argues that if the JJS
is willing to let go of punitive accountability, rehabilitation and public safety goals can be maximized
(2017).
In 2011, the Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform was created in the state of Georgia and
an executive order extended the council’s focus to the JJS in 2012 (Russell, 2017). With $5 million in
appropriations for the 2013 fiscal year and alongside Pew Charitable Trusts and the Annie E. Casey
Foundation, the Special Council identified the reformation goals, reducing the amount of low-risk youth
(less likely to reoffend) within Georgia’s Department in Juvenile Justice (DJJ) secure residential facilities,
reducing out-of-home commitment adjudications, and an overall reduction in Georgia’s juvenile recid-
ivism rate through juvenile risk and need assessments (Russell, 2017). Russell found that instead of
increasing arrests, Georgia’s bold new placement policies, like diverting low-risk youth [who received low
scores for the likelihood to reoffend on the risk and needs assessment], and restricting commitment and
out-of-home placements happened alongside lower levels of law enforcement referrals to juvenile court
(2017).
One of Russell’s major recommendations was directed at policymakers, encouraging state lead-
ers to use their political influence to advocate for the application of research, data and structured deci-
sion-making in the juvenile court’s response to charged youth (2017). While knowing that one’s ‘political
support can have a marked impact’, might be enough for some politicians, others might need reassurance
that the public will be in agreeance with their decision to lean in a particular direction in terms of juve-
nile justice policy whether it be punitive, rehabilitative or a mix of the two.
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